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Abstract
This dissertation empirically studies bidder behavior in procurement auction en-
vironments. I apply auction theory to develop models explaining market outcomes
in two distinct settings. The empirical analysis uses detailed bid-level data and takes
advantage of the particular features of each market to estimate the models. I then
use the estimated parameters to conduct counterfactual analyses and identify specific
drivers of bidder behavior.
In the first setting, I study government procurement auctions for road repair
and construction projects in California. This market is characterized by significant
turnover of participants and there is a number of government programs in place de-
signed to prolong firm tenure. The first aspect of this market which I investigate
in Chapter 2 is learning-by-doing among inexperienced firms that have recently en-
tered this market. I extend previous methods for estimation of dynamic auction
games by developing a dynamic model of experience accumulation that allows for
intertemporally-linked costs and endogenous auction participation. I document the
presence of learning-by-doing in the data, and use the theoretical model to show that
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bidders with a higher level of experience have lower average costs than inexperienced
bidders. Consistent with dynamic incentives, my empirical results indicate that inex-
perienced firms charge lower markups and bid more aggressively in order to leverage
learning-by-doing and achieve cost reductions in the future.
Next, in Chapter 3, I address the subcontracting side of the highway procure-
ment auction market in California. I empirically investigate whether experience in
the subcontracting market can improve future prospects of new entrants. The evi-
dence on learning-by-doing from Chapter 2 suggests that experience obtained in the
primary market plays an important role in the future success of such firms. However,
many recent entrants participate as subcontractors before actively submitting bids
as primary contractors. I conclude that despite the fact that experience gained as a
subcontractor might be more limited in scope and task-specific, it can be a valuable
stepping stone for firms that have only recently entered this market.
Finally, in Chapter 4, which is joint work with Dr. Elena Krasnokutskaya and
Dr. Christian Terwiesch, I turn my attention to a very different auction market. In
this case, we analyze data from an online market for programming services to study
bilateral trading patterns that arise between buyers and sellers from distinct world
regions. Our methodology allows us to control for both the country-specific differences
in seller quality and the country-specific differences in buyers’ preference for particular
bidder attributes relative to price, as well as for differences in their outside options.
We decompose the clustering in trading into effects generated by various components
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of the model. We find that differences in cost distributions across seller countries
drive most of the clustering pattern.
Primary Reader: Professor Elena Krasnokutskaya
Secondary Reader: Professor Richard Spady
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This dissertation empirically studies bidder behavior in procurement auction en-
vironments. I apply auction theory to develop models explaining market outcomes
in two distinct settings. The empirical analyses use detailed bid-level data and take
advantage of the particular features of each market to estimate the models. I then
use the estimated parameters to conduct counterfactual analyses and identify the
main drivers of bidder behavior. Specifically, in the first setting I study the effects of
prior contracting and subcontracting experience on bidding and participation strate-
gies among recent entrants in highway procurement auctions; in the second setting,
I analyze bilateral trading patters between buyers and sellers in an online market for
programming services.
I begin by considering government procurement auctions for road repair and con-
struction projects in California. This market is characterized by significant turnover
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
of participants, and there are a number of government programs in place designed to
prolong firm tenure. In this dissertation I study two related aspects of this market.
First, in Chapter 2 I investigate learning-by-doing among inexperienced firms that
have only recently entered this market. In Chapter 3 I consider an even earlier period
in firms’ histories, which is their subcontracting experience prior to joining the market
as primary contractors.
In Chapter 2 I develop a dynamic model of experience accumulation that allows
for intertemporally-linked costs and endogenous auction participation. I extend pre-
viously developed methods for estimation of dynamic auction games and document
learning-by-doing in highway procurement auctions in California. I find that the av-
erage cost for bidders with the highest level of experience is 10% below the average
cost for the least experienced bidders. Consistent with dynamic incentives, my em-
pirical results indicate that inexperienced firms charge lower markups and bid more
aggressively in order to leverage learning-by-doing and achieve cost reductions in the
future. Using counterfactual analysis I conclude that if all new bidders became expe-
rienced the stronger competition would benefit the auctioneer through a 7% decrease
in the average procurement cost. This evidence provides a novel insight for affirma-
tive action in procurement auctions: in presence of learning-by-doing, bid preference
programs help bidders more quickly reap the benefits of experience and thus have im-




Chapter 3 examines firms’ level of experience as subcontractors prior to joining
the main market. Evidence on learning-by-doing presented in Chapter 2 suggests
that experience likely plays an important role in the future success of recent entrants.
However, many firms in this market participate as subcontractors before actively sub-
mitting bids as primary contractors. Serving as a potential subcontractor to one or
more firms increases the probability of carrying out at least a portion of the project
workload. While experience gained as a subcontractor is more limited in scope and
task-specific, it can be a valuable stepping stone for firms that have only recently
entered the market. This chapter therefore focuses on subcontractor experience ac-
cumulated before entering the procurement auction market as a primary contractor.
In Chapter 4, which is joint work with Dr. Elena Krasnokutskaya and Dr. Chris-
tian Terwiesch, we study bilateral trading patterns between different countries using
data from an online market for programming services. Our methodology allows us
to control for the country-specific differences in the quality of participating sellers
as well as the country-specific differences in buyers’ price sensitivity and their out-
side options. We decompose the clustering in trading into the effects generated by
different components of the model and assess gains from trade in this market.
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Chapter 2
Dynamic Model of Bidder
Learning in Procurement Auctions
Procurement auctions account for a large proportion of expenditures at all levels
of government. According to the U.S. Economic Census in 2005, the U.S. federal gov-
ernment spent $378 billion using procurement auctions, with roughly 20% of these
funds going to highway, street and bridge construction.1 Government procurement
auctions often include controversial bid preference programs that provide some bid-
ders favorable treatment.2 Frequent targets of such policies are small businesses,
women, minority or veteran-owned firms, or firms hiring local subcontractors. The
1California receives a significant proportion of these expenditures, with $10.6 billion of spending
on construction projects in 2007.
2For example, a favored bidder with a 5% bid preference would win an auction despite not
submitting the lowest bid, if her bid was within 5% of the lowest bid. However, bid preference is
only applied for bid comparison, so the bidder would receive her full bid amount for carrying out
the work.
4
CHAPTER 2. DYNAMIC MODEL OF BIDDER LEARNING
controversy arises because the motivation for these programs is often political rather
than economic and the discussion centers around fairness of redistribution of govern-
ment resources rather than the underlying economic rationale. I contribute to the
limited evidence on the long-run effects of bid preference programs by providing a
novel economic insight regarding the benefits arising from the prolonged presence of
firms in market environments with learning.
In this chapter, I study learning-by-doing among inexperienced bidders in re-
peated procurement auctions for highway construction projects. When bidders’ costs
improve with additional experience the benefits of winning a contract extend beyond
the current period by helping the winning firm face more advantageous cost distri-
bution in the future. Dynamic incentives then drive firms to bid more aggressively
at lower levels of experience and forgo current profits in order to gain more experi-
ence. The learning effect depicts the improving ability of firms to master the complex
construction process that often consists of a large number of tasks and requires a
high-degree of coordination and government supervision.
To capture bidder learning, I develop and estimate a dynamic auction model of
experience accumulation that allows for intertemporal linking of costs for new firms
and endogenous auction participation. In the first stage, eligible firms simultaneously
decide whether or not to participate in the auction. In the second stage, participating
firms submit bids and the winner is determined in a first-price sealed-bid auction. To
allow for learning-by-doing firms that only recently entered the procurement market
5
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are modeled to have flexible cost distributions that can evolve over time. In particular,
the average cost is allowed to depend on the level of experience, as measured by the
cumulative number of all contracts awarded to a firm in the past. Winning a project
then has implications extending into the future by improving the average cost in all
following auction rounds. This incentive leads inexperienced firms to become more
competitive and lower current markups to acquire additional experience. The par-
ticipation and bidding decisions therefore depend not only on the set of competitors
but also on their respective levels of experience.
The model is estimated using data from procurement auctions administered by
the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) during the period from July
2003 to June 2009. The focus of this paper is on inexperienced firms, which are not
observed sufficiently often to estimate firm-specific behavior. However, I expect firms
with similar levels of experience to undergo comparable learning-by-doing, which
allows me to pool firms together by experience level. I extend and apply the estima-
tion methods for dynamic auction games previously developed by Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer (2003).1 The two-step estimation starts by using the observed data to
compute the entry probabilities, state transitions and bidding strategies conditional
on state variables. In the second step, I employ the theoretical predictions of optimal
behavior to recover the parameters of the cost distributions.
The empirical results document learning-by-doing in this market. I find that for
recent entrants accumulating experience results in driving down future average cost
6
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and helping them become more competitive. Comparing bidders across experience
levels, the average cost of the most experienced bidders is about 10% below the cost
of the least experienced ones. Consistent with dynamic incentives, the empirical
results show that bidders charge lower markups at lower levels of experience. As
expected, bidders who consider the dynamic effects of learning-by-doing will forgo
current profits in order to achieve cost reductions in the future.
The counterfactual analysis further explores the economic significance of bidder
learning. I find that bidder experience has important implications for firms’ costs and
markups as well as for the auction outcomes from the perspective of the auctioneer. As
a result of leveraging learning-by-doing at low levels of experience, more experienced
firms are able to bid more competitively while charging higher markups. As new firms
gain experience their costs and markups approach the costs and markups of regular
firms. The implications of bidder learning are substantial, especially on large projects,
where exogenous improvement of a bidder’s experience from the minimum to the
maximum level would result in a 11% drop in the average cost. In addition, I examine
changes in the auction outcome when bidders are forced to face stronger competition.
Since bidders respond strategically to their opponents, changing the experience level
of all new bidders to the highest possible level would intensify competition and result
in a 7% decrease in the average procurement cost, benefiting the auctioneer.
These results confirm the importance of dynamic incentives in environments with
learning-by-doing and suggest that policies affecting the speed of experience acqui-
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sition have important long-term benefits that have not yet been considered. This
evidence provides a novel insight for affirmative action in procurement auctions, and
indicates that the effects of bid preference programs can extend well beyond the period
in which the discount has originally been provided.
This paper relates to the literature on the estimation of dynamic auctions and
builds on the model developed by Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003)1 to examine
the effects of capacity constraints. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer consider dynamic
behavior in response to the level of backlog and studied the interaction among the
largest and most frequent bidders. Balat (2013)2 extended this setup by accounting
for unobserved auction heterogeneity and endogenous participation. In contrast, the
focus of this paper is on firms which can benefit from learning-by-doing while estab-
lishing themselves in the market. Unlike backlog, which measures how stretched out
a firm’s resources are, I use the number of projects won in the past as a measure
of experience that captures the cumulative knowledge and ability to carry out con-
struction projects. Importantly, backlog and experience drive costs in the opposite
directions: high levels of backlog tend to increase both future costs and the level of
experience; but with bidder learning, high levels of experience tend to decrease costs.
Groeger (2013)3 considers dynamics in the bid preparation rather than construc-
tion costs, and studies the relationship between participation in the most recent auc-
tion and future entry costs. This type of learning can be exploited by re-ordering of
contracts. Other changes to auction rules have been analyzed in a variety of static auc-
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tions with endogenous participation by Athey et al.(2010),4 Levin and Smith (1994),5
Roberts and Sweeting (2010).6 Saini(2012)7 studies the optimal auction schedule with
capacity-constrained bidders in a theoretical model.
Secondly, this paper relates to the large existing literature on learning-by-doing.
Learning-by-doing has been explored in a variety of settings, from aircraft manufac-
turing (Benkard (2000)8) to service organizations (Darr et al.(1995)9). Despite abun-
dance of research on knowledge transfers within and across organizations, learning-
by-doing among bidders in repeated procurement auctions has not yet been examined.
Finally, the results presented in this paper have implications for the literature on
affirmative action in procurement auctions. Theoretically, bid preference programs
could increase or decrease the cost of procurement depending on the participation and
competitive response of favored and non-favored firms. Empirically, Marion (2007)10
and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011)11 have estimated the cost of such programs to
be relatively small. However, these estimates are based on static models and therefore
capture only the immediate effects of bid preference programs without accounting for
the long-term benefits that would arise from bidder learning.
9
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2.1 Caltrans Data and
Empirical Motivation
This section describes the data used in the estimation, provides summary statistics
of relevant variables and presents preliminary evidence showing that participation
and bidding behavior of new firms depend on their experience. I find that more
experienced firms participate more often and submit lower bids than less experienced
firms. While these reduced-form results suggest that firms become stronger with
experience, without a full dynamic model it is not possible to determine whether this
is due to changing costs or changing markups.
The data consist of 3,415 contracts awarded by Caltrans over the time period
from July 2003 through June 2009. Data from the initial six months are used to
construct history of firms, leaving 3,292 projects that are used in the estimation.
Projects are awarded to the lowest bidder3 in repeated first-price sealed-bid auctions
and vary in scale and type, ranging from simple lane markings and signage, through
medium-size projects like lane resurfacing to large ones involving bridge or highway
construction. The data contain information on project characteristics such as the type
of work and location of the project, estimated number of working days, engineer’s
estimate of project cost, source of funding (federal/state), date at which the project
was first advertised, letting date, as well as the winning bidder and the winning bid.
3Caltrans runs a pre-qualification process which ensures required quality of work.
10
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Furthermore, the data include information on bidders and planholders such as the
name and address of the business, decision to submit a bid as well as the bid amount.
Overall, there are 2,482 unique firms that request planholder materials but only
1,057 of these firms submit at least one bid, and only 461 of these firms win at least one
auction. I categorize firms according to their level of experience into regular, new,
and fringe firms. There are 18 regular firms, which are the largest, most frequent
participants and have won more than 30 auctions over the period. On the other
hand, there are 500 small firms that are potentially subject to learning-by-doing and
are the focus on this paper. The remaining category consists of 1,964 fringe firms,
which never won and submitted fewer than 6 bids in their lifetime. Only 541 out of
these fringe firms ever submitted any bid.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the size and duration of projects, as
well as the number of planholders and bidders per project. The average size of
a project is $4.5 million, with the average duration of about 5 months. However,
there is substantial variability among projects, with projects ranging in size from the
smallest of $74,000 to the largest of $1.5 billion. Similarly, projects range in duration
from 5 days to almost 7 years.
Another view of the data is provided by looking at summary statistics by bidder
type, presented in Table 2.2. As expected, regular bidders are the most active and
the most frequent participants both in the role of planholders as well as bidders.
On average, regular bidders ordered planholder materials for 377 projects, resulting
11
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Contract Characteristics
Mean SD Min Max Total
Engineer’s Estimate ($million) 4.5 29.1 0.1 1,480 14,883
Working days 148 213 5 2,490 -
Number of planholders 13.6 8.6 2 73 44,856
Regular 2.1 1.7 0 9 6,790
New 8.7 5.3 0 38 28,601
Fringe 2.9 4.2 0 53 9,465
Number of bidders 5.4 3.3 1 32 17,861
Regular 1.2 1.2 0 7 4,102
New 3.7 2.6 0 21 12,253
Fringe 0.5 1.1 0 13 1,506
Note: Based on the sample of 3,292 projects used in the estimation.
in 228 submitted bids of which 57 were winning bids. In contrast, new bidders
ordered planholder materials for 61 projects and submitted 26 bids leading to 5 wins.
There is substantial variability even within bidder types, with the most successful
firm winning 260 projects based on 1,083 bids, after ordering planholder materials
for 1,412 projects, which is almost half of all auctioned projects. There rest of the
market consists of fringe firms, which are likely subcontractors ordering planholder
materials with the intention of becoming familiar with the project for negotiating
purposes rather than with the intention to submit a bid. Overall, more than 68% of
projects are awarded to new firms with the rest awarded to regular firms, indicating
the economic significance of small firms in this market.
12
CHAPTER 2. DYNAMIC MODEL OF BIDDER LEARNING
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics - Behavior of Firms by Type
Mean SD Min Max Total
Number of plans ordered 44,856
Regular bidders 377.2 300.7 128 1,412 6,790
New bidders 60.6 73.4 1 598 30,297
Number of bids submitted 17,861
Regular bidders 227.9 230.2 90 1,083 4,102
New bidders 25.6 32.5 0 264 12,782
Number of contracts awarded 3,292
Regular bidders 57.0 53.2 30 260 1,026
New bidders 4.5 6.0 0 30 2,266
Note: Based on the sample of 3,292 projects used in the estimation.
2.1.1 Reduced-Form Results
Using the Caltrans data described in the preceding section, I present reduced-form
evidence showing the relationship between bidder’s history of successful bidding and
future participation and bidding behavior. The results indicate that additional past
experience, even after controlling for backlog, increases the probability of participa-
tion in the future and allows bidders to submit more competitive bids. While this
preliminary evidence suggests the presence of learning, only a full dynamic model can
provide insight into the effects of experience on the underlying costs.
I consider the effect of experience on the probability of entry, followed by results
exploring the relationship between experience and the level of the bid. Table 2.3
shows the results of a probit regression of the decision to participate in an auction
regressed on the level of past experience, estimated on the set of new planholders.
In order to separate the effects of backlog and experience, I partition the measure of
13
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Table 2.3: Probability of Participation Regressed on the Number of Past
Awarded Contracts)
(1) (2)
log(number of contracts within past 6 months) 0.032*** 0.036***
(0.007) (0.009)
log(number of contracts 6 to 12 months in the past) 0.050*** 0.064***
(0.007) (0.009)
log(number of contracts 12 to 18 months in the past) 0.011 0.015
(0.008) (0.011)
log(number of contracts more than 18 months in the past) 0.022*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.004)
log(Engineer’s estimate) −0.124*** −0.015
(0.006) (0.009)
Funding Source (Federal=1) −0.049*** −0.014
(0.017) (0.028)
Number of Planholders - Regular −0.042*** −0.103***
(0.005) (0.008)
Number of Planholders - New −0.008*** −0.031***
(0.001) (0.002)
Number of Planholders - Fringe 0.000 0.011***
(0.002) (0.003)
Standardized backlog −0.090*** −0.117***
(0.012) (0.018)
Year, Month and District Indicators N Y
N 30.297 30,297
Note: Standard errors provided in parentheses. All specifications also include a constant.
Statistical significance: 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
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experience into four non-overlapping intervals. The regression presented in the second
column controls for seasonality and regional differences by including year, month and
district dummies. The coefficients on the past experience are positive and significant,
suggesting that more experienced bidders participate in auctions more frequently,
even after controlling for their level of backlog. As expected, new bidders are less
likely to participate when they face a larger number of competitors, whether those
competitors are regular or new firms.
Table 2.4: Log(Bid) Regressed on the Number of Past Awarded Contracts
(1) (2)
log(number of contracts within past 6 months) −0.001 −0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
log(number of contracts 6 to 12 months in the past) −0.011*** −0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
log(number of contracts 12 to 18 months in the past) 0.000 −0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
log(number of contracts more than 18 months in the past) −0.009*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001)
log(Engineer’s estimate) 0.987*** 0.994***
(0.004) (0.004)
Funding Source (Federal=1) 0.016 −0.024**
(0.011) (0.011)
Number of Planholders - Regular −0.032*** −0.016***
(0.004) (0.004)
Number of Planholders - New −0.018*** −0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Number of Planholders - Fringe −0.037*** −0.024***
(0.007) (0.005)
Standardized backlog −0.003 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004)
Year, Month and District Indicators N Y
N 12.782 12.782
Note: Standard errors provided in parentheses. All specifications also include a constant.
Statistical significance: 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
Table 2.4 presents the results of an OLS regression of the logarithm of the bid
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amount on the past experience. Again, past experience is partitioned into non-
overlapping intervals. Even after controlling for backlog, past experience is nega-
tively correlated with bid amount, indicating that more experienced firms are able
to submit lower bids. Note that the effect of backlog is positive, as expected, since
higher levels of backlog constrain firm’s resources, tend to increase marginal costs,
and make winning less desirable. On the other hand, if learning-by-doing is present
in this market, experience will have the opposite effect on costs, and can be consistent
with a decrease in bid levels.
Number of contracts won in the past is one among many possible measures of
experience. To confirm that other measures would yield similar results, Appendix
2.9 shows corresponding regression results based on the dollar value of past awarded
projects as the independent variable, rather than the number of awarded projects.
The results are qualitatively similar, confirming that the number of contracts won in
the past is an appropriate measure of the overall level of experience.
Preliminary reduced-form evidence suggests the presence of bidder learning: firms
new to the market are less active (submit fewer bids) than their competitors, and con-
ditional on participation the bid amount decreases with past experience, as measured
by either the number of submitted bids or the value of awarded contracts. New firms
are able to lower their bids perhaps due to facing more advantageous cost distribu-
tions, helping them to be better able to compete against their stronger competitors;
this holds even when controlling for backlog. This is consistent with long-run effects
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of bidder learning, when costs are lowered for firms that are able to remain in the
market for longer periods of time and become more competitive. However, without a
full dynamic model it is not possible to determine whether this decline in bids is due
to cost synergies or simply reduced markups.
2.2 Model
I start by constructing a theoretical model of repeated procurement auctions with
flexible cost functions, which can capture learning-by-doing experienced by new firms
as they enter the market for highway procurement, and firm-level participation de-
cision. After explaining the setup, timing, and assumptions used in the model, I
proceed by defining the state variable and the state transition. I conclude by for-
mulating the components of the participation and bidding decisions, and outlining
the steps involved in computing the value function and expressing it in terms of
observables.
The model is a dynamic bidding game in which new firms’ costs are inter-temporally
linked through their past experience; as new firms gain experience through project
construction, it translates into lower future construction costs. Furthermore, this
model takes advantage of the availability of data on the set of planholders and ex-
plicitly includes firm-level participation decision.
The framework builds on the model originally developed by Jofre-Bonet and Pe-
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sendorfer (2003)1 to study capacity constraints among large firms. In contrast, I
focus on smaller firms and their bidding experience as they establish themselves in
the market.
2.2.1 Setup
There are three types of risk-neutral firms: regular firms, which have extensive
experience and therefore their costs are unlikely to change due to winning additional
auctions; new firms, which are the focus of this paper, and which have costs inter-
temporally linked through their level of experience, and therefore subject to learning-
by-doing and most likely to benefit from additional experience; and, finally, short-lived
fringe firms, which are subcontracting firms that request project materials but rarely
proceed in submitting a bid. Denote the type of firm i by k(i) ∈ {reg, new, fri}.
In each of the infinite number of discrete time periods t ∈ 1, 2, . . . a single contract
is offered in a first-price sealed-bid auction.4 Contract in period t has observable
characteristics zt, like type of work, size, or duration, which are assumed to be i.i.d.
draws from distribution function of project characteristics Fz. Firms discount future
with a common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), which is fixed over time.
4Following previous literature (Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003),1 Balat (2013),2 and Groeger
(2013)3), I treat each auction as independent even though multiple projects are sometimes auctioned
off on the same day.
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2.2.2 Stage Game
The stage game can be split into two stages: in the first stage, an exogenous subset
of firms currently in the market that have requested the project documents (so called
planholders) decide whether or not to participate in the auction; this step gives rise to
the set of bidders. In the second stage, bidders decide on the dollar value of their bids.
Participation stage
1. In period t, an auction for a single contract with observable characteristics
zt ∼ Fz(.), such as type of work, size, or duration of the project is announced.
State vector st, measuring the stock of past experience of all new bidders, is
also publicly observable and contains the level of experience of all new firms.
2. An exogenous set of planholders (Nt) receive private draws of participation
costs from a common distribution, φit ∼ Fφ(.|zt;λ), and decide whether or not
to participate in the auction
19
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Bidding stage
1. The outcome of the participation stage, the set of bidders (Nt ⊆ Nt), is realized
and observed by all firms.
2. Bidders receive private draws from type-specific distributions of construction
costs: cit ∼ F newc (.|zt, Nt, sit; θnewc ) for new firms; and cit ∼ F regc (.|zt; θregc ) for
experienced firms. Note that unlike for new firms, the cost distribution for
regular firms does not depend on the state variable and hence on their past
experience.
3. All bidders simultaneously submit bids (bit) that maximize their expected dis-
counted future profits. The submitted bids are ranked and the contract is
awarded to the lowest bidder.
The long-run benefits of learning for new firms occur when winning contracts and
accumulating experience improves their future costs. This process is captured by
new firms’ costs which are inter-temporally linked through the stock of their past
experience, unlike the costs of regular firms.
Following previous literature, I assume there is no binding reserve price. For
auctions with a single bidder, I simulate a competitor by taking a draw from the
distribution of construction costs of regular firms.
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2.2.3 State Variables and State Transitions
The state variable is publicly observable and defined as the stock of experience
of new firms, st, and is measured by the number of contracts previously awarded to
each new bidder. Therefore, a new bidder’s experience increases by one after winning
a project and therefore evolves deterministically conditional on the state variable in
the previous period and the identity of the current winner. The component of the
transition function for a new firm i is given by
sit = ω(si(t−1), jwin) =

si(t−1) + 1 if jwin = i
si(t−1) otherwise,
where si(t−1) is bidder i’s stock of experience at the end of period t − 1 and jwin is
the identity of the winning bidder in the current period. While the empirical section
of this paper uses the number of contracts won in the past, there are other variables
that could be used to capture the level of construction experience in this market and
provide additional variation, such as the number of submitted bids or the value of
projects for which bids were submitted. An important issue, though not addressed
in this paper, is horizontal subcontracting of firms. In any auction, firms can choose
to participate in the role of a primary bidder or as a potential subcontractor for one
or more of its competitors. This affects the bidding strategy as firms consider the
tradeoff between higher likelihood of performing at least part of the work in the role
of subcontractor versus the lower likelihood of becoming the main contractor. Since
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the experience accumulated as a subcontractor is very specific and limited in scope,
I assume that only winning as the primary contractor can improve future costs. I
investigate the effects of subcontractor experience in Chapter 3.
2.2.4 Equilibrium
Assuming conditional independence of contract characteristics and private par-
ticipation and construction cost realizations allows me to focus on anonymous type-
symmetric strategies, so that conditional on observables only current state and pri-
vate shocks determine optimal actions; hence, I drop the time subscript t from the
notation. The strategy of bidder i of type k(i) consists of a participation strategy
σdk(i)(φi, z,N , s) mapping private participation cost draws to the decision to submit
a bid, σdk(i) : (φi, z,N , s) → di ∈ {0, 1}; and a bidding strategy, mapping private
construction cost draws to bid amounts, σbk(i) : (ci, z, N, s) → bi ∈ [0,∞). In order
to ensure invertibility, I assume that the bidding function is monotonically increasing





k(i)), and the strategy profile of its rivals by σ−i.
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of this game is the set of strategies σ∗ such
that the prescribed strategy for any bidder i given by σ∗i is the best response to σ
∗
j
for all bidders j, and the equilibrium beliefs on the probability of entry are consistent
with the strategies in σ∗. Furthermore, I assume that the data is generated by a
single MPE strategy profile.
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2.2.5 Participation and Bidding Decisions
When deciding on entry into an auction, planholders compare the net expected
profits from entry against the expected profits from staying out of the auction, taking
into account the impact of their decisions on the expected future profits through state
transitions. In particular, firms anticipate that acquiring additional experience will
lead to better costs in the future, while by not participating in an auction they cer-
tainly forgo the possibility of any additional experience. Conditional on entry, bidders
maximize their expected discounted future profits, incorporating their expectations
about future distributions of costs, project characteristics, the set of planholders, and
states.
Assuming that other bidders follow their optimal strategy as prescribed by σ∗,
the continuation value for a planholder i of type k(i) on a project with characteristics
z, set of rival planholders N , in state s with a draw of participation costs φi can be
expressed as
Wk(i)(z,N , s, φi;σ∗) = max
d∈{0,1}
{




where W 1k(i) and W
0
k(i) are the expected value of entering and not entering the auction,
respectively.
In particular, conditional on the decision to enter, the expected payoff from entry
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before accounting for participation costs consists of the sum of the expected payoff
in the current period and the expected discounted future payoffs,









Pr(j wins|b, z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j))
}
dF k(i)c (ci|z,N, s)
]
(2.2)
where the expectation is taken over the set of possible bidder configurations which
include firm i (i.e. all possible subsets of planholders that contain i). The first line
in Equation (2.2) is the expected payoff in the current period and depends on the
markup and the probability that bidder i wins the current auction, conditional on his
bid. The second line represents the expected discounted future profit, and depends
on bidder i’s continuation value in the future period as well as on the transition
into the future state, which in turn is a function of the probability of winning of
different bidders. W 1k(i)(z,N , s;σ∗) is evaluated before firm i receives its draw of the
construction cost, and hence must integrate this cost out over the distribution of
possible costs.
On the other hand, the current period expected payoff from not entering an auction
is zero, so the expected value of staying out of an auction depends only on the
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probability that other participating firms win and the resulting continuation value,





Pr(j wins|z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j))
]
. (2.3)
In this case, the expectation is taken over all subsets of planholders that exclude firm
i, denoted as N¬i.
In equilibrium, bidders will decide to enter the auction if the expected value of
entry net of entry costs exceeds the expected value of non-entry,
W 1k(i)(z,N , s;σ∗)− φi ≥ W 0k(i)(z,N , s;σ∗).
The ex-ante value function before the project characteristics, the set of planhold-











1− pk(i)(z,N , s)
)
W 0i (z,N , s;σ∗)
]
, (2.4)
where ζk(i)(z,N , s;σ∗) denotes the incremental value of entry over non-entry, and
corresponds to the entry cost that makes a bidder just indifferent between entry and
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non-entry,
ζk(i)(z,N , s;σ∗) = W 1k(i)(z,N , s;σ∗)−W 0k(i)(z,N , s;σ∗),
while pk(i)(z,N , s) is the equilibrium conditional choice probability of entry for a
bidder of type k(i), defined by
pk(i)(z,N , s;σ∗) =
∫
1{ζk(i)(z,N , s;σ∗) ≥ φ}dFφ(φ). (2.5)
2.2.6 Value Function
To proceed, I first express the expected participation cost conditional on entry as
a function of the equilibrium probability of participation. To simplify notation, I omit
the explicit dependence of the probability of participation and the incremental value
of entry on the project characteristics, set of planholders and the state variable, and
let pk(i) ≡ pk(i)(z,N , s;σ∗) and ζk(i) ≡ ζk(i)(z,N , s;σ∗). Assuming that participation
costs follow the exponential distribution, so φi ∼ Fφ(φ;λ), where Fφ(φ;λ) = 1− eλφ,
I can express the conditional expectation as a function of the incremental value of














5Details of the derivation are provided in Appendix 2.8.
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Substituting this conditional expectation of the participation cost given in Equa-
tion (2.6) back into the value function in Equation (2.4) and using the definition of






























































Furthermore, substituting for the value of entry W 1k(i) and non-entry W
0
k(i) from

















Pr(j wins|b, z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j);σ∗)








Pr(j wins|z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j);σ∗)
 . (2.8)
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Since the value function specifies behavior in equilibrium assuming that all other
bidders behave optimally as prescribed by σ∗, the probability of a bidder winning an
auction can be expressed as a function of the equilibrium bid distributions, which
can be estimated from the available data. Let Gnew(.|z,N, s) denote the distribution
function of equilibrium bids of a new bidder is state (z,N, s) with associated density
gnew(.|s,N, z). Similarly, let Greg(.|z,N) be the distribution function of equilibrium
bids for a regular, experienced bidder, with associated density greg(.|z,N).
Three different types of probabilities need to be specified. First is the probability
that bidder i wins when he enters the auction and submits bid b, which only happens
if all other participating bidders submit bids above b,






Second is the probability that bidder j wins given that bidder i submits bid b, which
occurs when bidder j submits a bid below b, while all remaining bidders bid above
bidder j’s bid,











Last is the probability that bidder j wins when bidder i does not enter the auction,
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which happens when all other bidders bid above bidder j’s bid,











New firms face construction costs that depend on their state, and therefore can
improve their future cost by acquiring additional experience. Regular and fringe
firms are assumed to face a stationary construction cost distribution that does not
depend on their experience, and hence maximize their current period payoff since
their expected future payoffs are going to be the same regardless of their current
action.
In order to compute the expectation over the set of bidders, I need to specify
the probability of observing a particular subset of planholders entering the auction:
Pr(N |N ). This probability depends on the probability of entry of each type of
planholder,






Nk(1− pk(z,N , s))N
k−Nk , (2.11)
where N k is the number of planholders of type k, while Nk is the number of bidders
of type k in a particular configuration N . To avoid computing this combinatorial
problem, I simulate different entry configurations based on estimated probabilities of
entry and average across these simulations.
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2.3 Identification
In this section, I provide the intuition for the identification of construction costs
and participation costs. The identification arguments follow previous literature on
the structural estimation of dynamic auctions and dynamic discrete choice models.
The market is assumed to be in steady state and all auctions are treated as indepen-
dent, which allows me to identify the conditional probability of participation, state
transitions and bid distributions. The distribution of the construction costs is traced
from the empirical bid distribution using the inverse bid function that characterizes
optimal behavior, and relies on the monotonicity assumption. On the other hand,
the parameters of the participation cost distribution are over-identified and depend
on the specified functional form.
2.3.1 Construction Costs
The first order condition (FOC) for optimal bidding behavior of new firms implies
that the privately known project construction cost ci for a bidder who submitted bid
b is given by6
6The derivation of this equation is provided in the appendix in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer
(2003).1
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where hk(i)(.|z,N, si, s−i) = g
k(i)(.|z,N,si,s−i)
1−Gk(i)(.|z,N,si,s−i)
is the hazard function of bids submitted
by bidder i of type k(i). The FOC relates the construction cost ci to the bid, the
distribution and density functions of equilibrium bids, and the value function. The
second term on the right hand side corresponds to the markup accounting for the
competition in the current period. However, unlike in a static auction, there is now
an additional term accounting for the incremental effect on future discounted profits
that arise when firm i wins the contract instead of another firm.
In order to recover the private construction costs, all objects on the right-hand
side of Equation (2.12) must be obtained. These include the bid hazard function,
the discount factor, the state transition function and the value function. The hazard
function depends on the distribution and density functions of equilibrium bids and
can be directly estimated from data on bids. The discount factor is not identified
from the data and is fixed.7 The state transition function is a deterministic function
described in the model setup.8 The remaining object is the value function, which is
given in Equation (2.8). However, this expression cannot be directly taken to data as
7In estimation, I fix β=0.995. If a firm obtains planholder materials for one project per month,
this would correspond to an annual discount factor of 0.94.
8However, in practice I aggregate levels of experience into a smaller number of bins. Transition
between different levels of experience is then estimated by a frequency estimator.
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it includes integration over the unobserved distribution of costs.
Following Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003)1 and Balat (2013)2 and substituting
the FOC from Equation (2.12) into the value function in Equation (2.8), the value
































Pr(j wins|z,N, s)Vi(ω(s, j))
 , (2.13)
where G(j)(b|z,N, s) corresponds to the ex-ante probability that bidder j wins with
a bid of b or less. The derivation is based on two observations: First, the probability
of winning can be expressed as a function of the distribution of bids by other bidders,
ignoring the dependance of other bidders’ bids on their own private cost draws, thus
reducing the dynamic game to a single agent dynamic decision problem, in which the
bidder i takes as given the equilibrium bid distribution of the other bidders. The
second issue arises from the presence of the private cost, which is not observed. This
can be solved by substituting the FOC into the value function. The derivation is
explained in detail in Appendix 2.8.
For a new bidder i at any state s from the set of states (s1, s2, . . . , sm), let the
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× (1{ω(s, j) = s1}, . . . , 1{ω(s, j) = sm})
 ,
where Ai is the expected current period profit net of entry costs and accounting
for the probability of entry, while Bi and Di are the 1 × m vectors of transition
probabilities for entry and non-entry, respectively. These components are specified
from the perspective of bidder i before making his own entry decision. For example,
the kth element of Bi(s) contains the probability of reaching state s
k from the state
s when bidder i decides to enter, incorporating his probability of entry.
Aggregating over all states allows me to write the value function in matrix no-
tation. Let Vi denote the vector (Vi(s
1), . . . , Vi(s
m))′, Ai = Ai(s
1), . . . , Ai(s
m))′,
Bi = Bi(s
1), . . . , Bi(s
m))′ and Di = Di(s
1), . . . , Di(s
m))′. Then
Vi = Ai + βBiVi + βDiVi
= Ai + β (Bi +Di)Vi,
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Ai = [I − β(Bi +Di)]−1Ai. (2.14)
With value function estimated using Equation (2.14), all objects on the right-hand
side of the FOC in Equation (2.12) can be estimated from data, and the parameters
of the construction cost distribution can be recovered. The FOC together with the
monotonicity assumption imply that the inverse bid function conditional on state
variables is defined as c = (σb)−1(b|z,N, s). Furthermore, because of the relationship
between the distributions of costs and the associated bids,
F kc (c|z,N, s) = Gk(i)(σbk(c, z,N, s)|z,N, s).
Once the value function is estimated, F kc (.|z,N, s) can be recovered by integrating the
estimated bid distribution functions Ĝk(.|z,N, s) and using the inverse bid function
derived from the FOC,
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2.3.2 Participation Costs
The parameter of the participation cost distribution can be identified by taking
advantage of the functional form assumption on the participation cost distribution
and employing the fact that in equilibrium beliefs are going to be correct.
Entry costs are assumed to be distributed exponentially with parameter λ, with
distribution Fφ(φit|zt) = 1−e−λ(zt)φ and with the associated probability density func-
tion fφ(φit|zt) = λ(zt)e−λ(zt)φ, where λ(zt) = λ0 + λ1zt. The conditional equilibrium
probability of entry can be expressed as a function of the incremental value of en-
try over non-entry, and corresponds to the participation cost that makes a firm just
indifferent between entry and non-entry,
pk(z,N , s;λ) = Fφ(ζ(z,N , s);λ) = Fφ(W 1k (z,N , s)−W 0k (z,N , s);λ). (2.16)
2.4 Estimation
I use the data from Caltrans described in Section 2.1 to estimate the parameters
of construction and participation cost distributions. Construction costs are recovered
using the inverse bid function that characterizes the optimal bidding behavior. This
requires estimates of the bid distribution and value function, which in turn depends
on the estimates of the probability of entry and state transitions. Bid distribution
together with the conditional entry probabilities and state transitions are obtained in
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the first stage of the estimation, which then allow me to calculate the value function at
all states. Using the inverse bid function I then trace out the underlying distribution
of construction costs and estimate its moments. In the final step, I use a moment
estimator to recover the parameters of the participation cost distribution.
To make estimation feasible, the level of experience for new bidders is aggregated
into Q non-overlapping categories. In practice, I split experience into 5 categories:
category 1 (no contracts awarded in the past), category 2 (one contract awarded in
the past), category 3 (2-3 contracts awarded in the past), category 4 (4-10 contracts
won in the past), and category 5 (more than 10 contracts won in the past).
I use the engineer’s estimate and a measure of overall backlog as observable project
characteristics. Engineer’s estimate is categorized into five quintiles, while the backlog
measure is an indicator based on the proportion of regular bidders with above-average
backlog. This variable measures how constrained overall are the firms in the market.
The goal of the first step of the estimation is to flexibly estimate the probability
of entry, state transition, and conditional bid functions.
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2.4.1 Conditional Probability of Entry and
State Transitions
The conditional probability of entry (p̂k(z,N , s)) is estimated using the following
probit specification separately for each bidder type,
Pr(dit = 1|z,N , s) = Φ
(




β3+q#New(q) + β9#Fringe + β10OwnExp ∗ 1{k(i) = new}
)
On the other hand, state transitions are estimated using a frequency estimator.
While the transition process is deterministic in the sense that the experience of a
firm increases by one every time this firms wins an auction, in practice the level
of experience is aggregated into five levels. Transition between different levels then
depends on the probability of a firm having the highest level of experience within a
level, and thus progressing to the next level. The probability that a bidder with the
current level of experience s̄ will move to the next level of experience s̄ is estimated
using a frequency estimator,




t 1{sit = max(s̄), zt = z̃,Nt = Ñ }∑
i
∑
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2.4.2 Conditional Bid Distribution
Following Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003)1 and Balat (2013),2 I estimate the
parameters of the conditional bid distribution (θ̂) using maximum likelihood. I assume
that the scaled bids follow Weibull distribution, so the corresponding density function
for a bidder of type k ∈ {new, reg} is




































2,11OwnExp ∗ 1{k(i) = new}.











CHAPTER 2. DYNAMIC MODEL OF BIDDER LEARNING
2.4.3 Value Function
With the estimates of the bid distribution, probability of entry and state transi-
tions in hand, I use Equation (2.14) to compute the value function on the vector of
states. Given the parameters of the bid distribution θ̂, I can compute the distribu-
tion and density functions of the equilibrium bids, Ĝk(b|z, s,N, θ̂) and ĝk(b|z, s,N, θ̂),
and hence also the hazard function ĥk(b|z, s,N, θ̂) for any particular combination of
(z̃, s̃, Ñ). Together with the estimated probability of entry p̂k̃(z̃, s̃, Ñ ) this allows
me to calculate the vector of current period expected profits Ai(s) and the matri-
ces of transition probabilities Bi(s) and Di(s) conditional on entry and non-entry,
respectively.
The expectation over the project characteristics is approximated by sampling from
the observed set of projects. Similarly, to compute the expectation over the set
of bidders, I consider a given set of planholders and simulate entry of individual
planholders based on the estimated conditional probability of entry.
2.4.4 Construction and Participation Costs
After obtaining the value function, I can directly apply the inverse bid function
defined by the FOC in Equation (2.12) to recover the cost for any bid amount, given
the combination of (z̃, s̃, Ñ ). To recover the full distribution of construction costs, I
use Equation (2.15) to integrate over the estimated bid distribution.
39
CHAPTER 2. DYNAMIC MODEL OF BIDDER LEARNING
On the other land, λ can be recovered by employing the fact that in equilibrium
beliefs are going to be correct. I use a moment estimator that minimizes the square
of the distance between the probability of entry implied by the model p(λ) and its
empirical counterpart p̂ obtained from data,
λ̂ = arg min
λ
(p̂− p(λ))′W (p̂− p(λ))
2.5 Results
The estimation results from the structural model are organized in the following
way. I start with a discussion of the first-stage estimates of entry probabilities and
bid distribution parameters, and proceed by presenting the recovered parameters of
the construction and entry costs. The estimated construction costs for new bidders
demonstrate the dependence on past experience, and converge to the distribution of
costs of regular bidders for the maximum level of experience. Results indicate the
presence of bidder learning in this market and show that recent entrants benefit from
acquiring additional experience. The estimated average cost of the most experienced
among new bidders are substantially lower than the average cost of the least experi-
enced firms bidding on the same project, and this difference is especially pronounced
for large projects.
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2.5.1 Probability of Entry and Bid Distribution
The parameters of the conditional probability of entry for each type of firm are
presented in Table 2.5. Larger projects tend to discourage entry, especially among
small and fringe bidders. Average backlog, which measures how capacity-constrained
are the regular planholders, does not seem to affect entry into auctions in a significant
way. It is likely that capacity-constrained firms, which would be most affected, are
not in the set of planholders and and choose to stay out of the auctions due to their
high backlog and inability to carry out construction work. On the other hand, the
competition effects are important. The presence of a larger number of regular firms
in an auction has a significant negative effect on the probability of entry for all types
of bidders. For new firms, additional competitors of any type decrease probability of
entry. Finally, the effect of experience (measured as the number of awarded projects
in the past) has the expected positive sign and is significant, meaning that more
experienced bidders participate in auctions relatively more often.
Table 2.6 presents the estimated parameters of the bid density function for each
type of bidder obtained using maximum likelihood and assuming Weibull distribution.
Since the dependent variable is the bid amount scaled by the engineer’s estimate, the
negative effect of engineer’s estimate indicates that bidders compete more aggres-
sively for larger projects. Similarly, a larger number of regular, fringe, or relatively
experienced new bidders intensifies competition. Furthermore, the effect of own ex-
perience for new bidders is negative, implying that higher level of experience allows
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Table 2.5: Probability of Entry
New Regular Fringe
Constant 0.2655*** 0.6711*** −0.4188***
Engineer’s Estimate −0.1248*** −0.0475*** −0.2254***
Backlog (Above/Below Average) 0.0005 0.0056 0.0027
# Regular Competitors −0.0396*** −0.0669*** −0.0413***
# Fringe Competitors −0.0029* −0.0294*** 0.0209***
# New Competitors (Exp1) −0.0151*** −0.0221** −0.0279***
# New Competitors (Exp2) −0.0102** −0.0068 0.0063
# New Competitors (Exp3) −0.0070* −0.0136 0.0192**
# New Competitors (Exp4) −0.0135*** −0.0182*** −0.0219***
# New Competitors (Exp5) −0.0033 0.0601*** −0.0167**
# Past wins 0.0241***
Note: Significance level at 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*)
these bidders to submit lower bids. However, without recovering the underlying cost
structure it is not possible to know whether bids decline because of lower markups or
changes in the construction costs.
The estimated bid distribution and density functions are presented in Figure 4.1.
The bid distribution functions for less experienced bidders generally stochastically
dominate the ones corresponding to more experienced new bidders and regular bid-
ders.
2.5.2 Construction and Participation Costs
Using the estimated bid distribution and applying the first-order condition, I can
recover the distribution of the corresponding construction costs. Since experience of
new bidders is likely going to be of special importance in auctions for the largest
projects, I focus my attention to projects in the highest quintile of the engineer’s
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Table 2.6: Bid Density
New Regular
Constant (shape) 1.285 1.245
Constant (scale) 0.315 0.240
Engineer’s Estimate −0.022 −0.017
Backlog (Above/Below Average) 0.011 −0.008
# Regular Competitors −0.038 −0.047
# Fringe Competitors −0.032 −0.044
# New Competitors (Exp1) 0.009 0.012
# New Competitors (Exp2) −0.019 −0.009
# New Competitors (Exp3) 0.000 0.013
# New Competitors (Exp4) −0.026 −0.019
# New Competitors (Exp5) −0.034 −0.057
# Past wins −0.007
Note: Estimated using maximum likelihood with Weibull distribu-
tion. Dependent variable is submitted bid scaled by the corresponding
engineer’s estimate.
estimate and with constrained bidders.
The estimated distribution and density functions of the recovered construction
costs for a large project with constrained bidders are presented in Figure 4.2. Again,
the cumulative distribution functions for less experienced bidders generally stochasti-
cally dominate the ones for experienced and regular bidders. With more experience,
the density of costs for new bidders shifts to the left, meaning that new bidders with
higher levels of experience face more advantageous cost distribution.
In order to quantify bidder learning that occurs as firms gain experience, Table
2.7 reports the estimated average cost by project size and backlog status. Overall,
the average cost declines for larger projects, which confirms the results detected from
estimated bid distributions that bidders are able to compete more aggressively for
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larger projects. For any particular project size and backlog status, the average cost
for new bidders generally declines with experience, with the exception of going from
the first to the second level of experience. Level 1 corresponds to no experience, so
consists of bidders before winning their first auction.
Comparing average cost across bidders with different levels of experience, I find
that the most experienced bidders have average cost about 10% below the average
cost of the least experienced bidders. For small project, the effect of experience is
more important for projects with less constrained bidders, while for large projects the
effect is greater for projects with constrained bidders.
Table 2.7: Average Cost by Project Size and Backlog Status
Eng Est Backlog
Reg New1 New2 New3 New4 New5
(quintile) (0/1)
1
0 0.763 0.967 1.063 1.024 0.957 0.811
1 0.828 0.952 0.971 0.986 0.915 0.848
2
0 0.752 0.931 1.014 0.944 0.890 0.785
1 0.816 0.939 1.017 0.964 0.900 0.808
3
0 0.770 0.620 0.989 0.906 0.813 0.754
1 0.754 0.923 0.975 0.932 0.850 0.776
4
0 0.730 0.792 0.931 0.751 0.821 0.737
1 0.743 0.849 0.979 0.915 0.833 0.760
5
0 0.719 0.817 0.910 0.882 0.802 0.725
1 0.732 0.834 0.932 0.876 0.822 0.731
Note: Projects are categorized according to the corresponding quin-
tile of the engineer’s estimate and a backlog indicator. Backlog indica-
tor measure the proportion of regular planholders with above-average
backlogs.
Furthermore I decompose bids into the underlying costs and markups. Figure 2.3
shows the inverse bid function by bidder type for a large project with constrained
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Figure 2.3: Inverse Bid Function for a Large Project
with Constrained Bidders
bidders. It shows that markups decline monotonically with cost. Less experienced
bidders have lower markups (with the exception of new bidders without any experi-
ence), suggesting that firms are willing to forgo some profits today in order to increase
their probability of winning and thus acquiring additional experience that would allow
them to face more advantageous costs in the future. As new firms gain experience,
their markups, and hence their inverse bid function, approach the inverse bid function
of regular bidders.
Finally, the parameter of the exponential participation distribution is estimated
to be 0.754.
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2.6 Simulation Results
I use the parameter estimates reported in the previous section in order to perform
a number of counterfactual experiments evaluating the importance of bidder learning
in the procurement auction market. In the first case, I quantify the effect of increasing
experience of a new bidder from the minimum to the maximum possible level and I
decompose this effect into the corresponding change in markup and the change in cost.
While both bids and costs decrease with more experience, the change in average cost
is relatively greater, allowing more experienced bidders to charge higher markups. In
the second case, I consider the effect of an exogenous change in the experience of all
new bidders. In particular, I look at the implications of making all new bidders have
the highest level of experience on the auction outcome. I find that average cost of
procurement declines as bidders become more competitive and markups drop. Both
of these scenarios confirm the importance of bidder learning in the long run.
Table 2.8: Effect of Increasing Level of Experience
1 2 3 4 5
Freq of entry 0.294 0.294 0.315 0.348 0.438
Freq of winning 0.201 0.141 0.186 0.216 0.252
Bid 0.949 0.988 0.966 0.925 0.860
Cost 0.825 0.898 0.857 0.808 0.735
Markup 0.124 0.090 0.109 0.116 0.125
Procurement cost (lowest bid) 0.661 0.662 0.663 0.656 0.639
Winners cost 0.323 0.333 0.338 0.337 0.336
Winners markup 0.338 0.329 0.324 0.319 0.303
Inefficiency 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.009
Note: Compares outcomes when a new bidder’s experience is increased
from the minimum level to the maximum.
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2.6.1 Effect of Bidder Learning on Cost and Markup
Bidder learning affects not only the frequency of entry and winning of new firms
but also the procurement cost and bidders’ profitability. Learning experienced by
new firms as they enter the market is exhibited through two channels that determine
the competitiveness of their bids in an auction. First, learning affects the cost dis-
tribution, with more experienced firms having more advantageous cost distributions.
Second, the level of bid is determined by the firm’s markup, with less experienced
firms charging lower markups in order to acquire additional experience, and more
experienced, stronger firms being able to charge higher markups.
The importance of the effect of learning can be evaluated by comparing the out-
comes from a simulated set of auctions in which the level of experience for a bidder
is exogenously increased. Table 2.8 presents the results of a simulation in which
the level of experience for a new bidder is increased from the lowest to the highest
level. With the exception of the initial level of no experience, the average bid declines
with additional experience by 13%. Note, however, that this change is a result of a
18% drop in the average cost, and an almost 40% increase in the average markup.
With more experience, bidders get stronger and better able to compete against their
competitors. After initially forgoing profits by lowering markups and gaining expe-
rience, the resulting lower cost allows them to increase the markup. Also note that
the increased competition benefits the auctioneer by a 3.5% decrease in the average
procurement cost.
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2.6.2 Effect of a Change in Experience
of All Bidders
Table 2.9 compares the outcome of a simulation in which the experience of all
new bidders is exogenously increased to the maximum level with the outcome under
the actual observed distribution of experience among new bidders. Since improving
competitiveness of any bidder affects not only the bidder himself but also the response,
in term of both participation and bidding strategy, of all his competitors, it is not
surprising to see that the average procurement cost declines by 7%. Since bidders are
now competing against stronger opponents, the winner’s average markup decreases
as well.




Procurement cost (lowest bid) 0.702 0.651
Winners cost 0.337 0.344
Winners markup 0.365 0.307
Inefficiency 0.015 0.087
Note: Compares outcomes under actual observed dis-
tribution of new bidders and a hypothetical in which all
new bidders have maximum possible level of experience.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper considers the long-run effects of bidder learning by examining the
changes in the cost distribution for bidders with different levels of experience. Us-
ing data from highway procurement auctions in California I demonstrate that recent
entrants in the market experience substantial cost improvements that arise with win-
ning additional contracts. This learning effect has important implications for the
evaluation of bid preference programs from the perspective of economic efficiency.
The results presented in this paper show that in presence of learning-by-doing it is
also in the auctioneer’s interest to encourage bidders to promptly acquire experience
and become more competitive. This novel insight for the economic justification of bid
preference programs also implies that any evaluation of the effect of bid preference
programs on the cost of procurement in a static setting leaves out the important
long-run consequences of learning and underestimtes the benefits of such programs.
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2.8 Appendix: Derivations and Proofs
2.8.1 Conditional Expectation of Entry Costs
Let X be a truncated exponential distribution with parameter λ > 0, 0 < x ≤ a.
Given the pdf and cdf of exponential distribution f(x) = λe−λx and F (x) = 1− e−λx,
respectively, we can derive the conditional expectation as follows:
E[X|0 < X ≤ a] =
∫ a
0















































Now letting a = 1
λ
k for some k > 0, we can further rewrite this expression as













Next, let p = F (a) = 1 − e−λa = 1 − e−k, which implies that k = − log(1 − p).
Substituting for k in the last equation and manipulating the result,
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Finally, multiplying by p, we obtain the desired result,







2.8.2 Value Function as a Function of
Equilibrium Bids
Following is the derivations of Equation (2.13). To simplify, let P = 1 + pk(i)
log(1−pk(i))







(b− ci)Pr(i wins|b, z,N, s;σ∗) + β ∑
j∈N
Pr(j wins|b, z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j))





Pr(j wins|z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j))
 .




[∫ {1− β∑j 6=i hk(j)(b|z,N, s)[Vi(ω(s, i))− Vi(ω(s, j))]∑
j 6=i h
k(j)(b|z,N, s)




Pr(j wins|b, z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j))




Pr(j wins|z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j))
 .
Next, note that the term for bidder i from the first sum on the second line,
β Pr(i wins|b, z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, i)), cancels out with the same term on the first line,
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[∫ {1 + β∑j 6=i hk(j)(b|z,N, s)Vi(ω(s, j))∑
j 6=i h
k(j)(b|z,N, s)







































Pr(j wins|z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j))

Changing the variable of integration from costs to bids using the facts that db =
∂σb(c)
∂c
dc and f((σb)−1(b)|s) · ∂(σ
b)−1(b)
∂b































Pr(j wins|z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j))

The expression on the second line can be modified further, by taking the summation
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where dGk(j)(b|z,N, s) =
∏
l 6=j[1 − Gk(l)(b|z,N, s)]gk(j)(b|z,N, s) is the derivative of
the probability that a bid of bidder j is the lowest bid. Substituting this expression

























Pr(j wins|z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j))

Furthermore, since I am considering type-symmetric strategies, the expression above












Pr(j wins|z,N, s;σ∗) +
∫
hk(i)(b|z,N, s)








Pr(j wins|z,N, s;σ∗)Vi(ω(s, j))
 .
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2.9 Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 2.10: Probability of Participation Regressed on the Value of Past
Awarded Contracts
(1) (2)
log(value of contracts within past 6 months) 0.008 *** 0.009 ***
(0.001) (0.002)
log(value of contracts 6 to 12 months in the past) 0.011 *** 0.011 ***
(0.001) (0.002)
log(value of contracts 12 to 18 months in the past) 0.004 *** 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
log(value of contracts more than 18 months in the past) 0.008 *** −0.006 ***
(0.001) (0.002)
log(Engineer’s estimate) −0.133 *** −0.016 *
(0.006) (0.009)
Funding Source (Federal=1) −0.046 *** −0.019
(0.017) (0.028)
Number of Planholders - Regular −0.038 *** −0.100 ***
(0.005) (0.008)
Number of Planholders - New −0.008 *** −0.032 ***
(0.001) (0.002)
Number of Planholders - Fringe 0.001 0.011 ***
(0.002) (0.003)
Standardized backlog −0.086 *** −0.110 ***
(0.012) (0.018)
Year, Month and District Indicators N Y
N 30.297 30.297
Note: Standard errors provided in parentheses. All specifications also include a constant.
Statistical significance: 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
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Table 2.11: Log(bid) Regressed on the Value of Past Awarded Contracts
(1) (2)
log(value of contracts within past 6 months) 0.000 −0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
log(value of contracts 6 to 12 months in the past) −0.002 *** −0.002 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
log(value of contracts 12 to 18 months in the past) 0.000 −0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
log(value of contracts more than 18 months in the past) −0.005 *** 0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
log(Engineer’s estimate) 0.990 *** 0.995 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
Funding Source (Federal=1) 0.015 −0.022 **
(0.011) (0.011)
Number of Planholders - Regular −0.034 *** −0.016 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
Number of Planholders - New −0.017 *** −0.007 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
Number of Planholders - Fringe −0.037 *** −0.023 ***
(0.007) (0.005)
Standardized backlog −0.004 0.006 *
(0.004) (0.004)
Year, Month and District Indicators N Y
N 12.782 12.782
Note: Standard errors provided in parentheses. All specifications also include a constant.





Procurement contracting is a frequently used tool to allocate government expendi-
tures, and often affects a large number of firms of various scales. While some of these
firms can be relatively enormous companies participating in the market for decades,
others are smaller businesses attempting to enter or establishing themselves in the
market. Government procurement auctions often have incentives in place that pro-
vide advantage to certain businesses, such as small firms or firms owned by veterans
or minorities. Sometimes these incentives come in the form of a direct discount on
contractor’s bid. Other times, they are specified as a percentage of contract value
that should be sourced from such businesses; these auctions usually give the primary
contractor the option to outsource part of the work to other firms through subcon-
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tracting. Subcontracting can therefore serve as an ideal route to gain experience and
“get a foot in the door” of the main procurement market.
Evidence of learning-by-doing in procurement auction markets, including the re-
sults from Chapter 2 of this dissertation suggests that experience plays an important
role in the future success of recent entrants. In Chapter 2, I quantified firms’ learning-
by-doing by considering how firms’ cost distributions evolve over time with respect to
their amount of prior experience. This is of particular importance for recent entrants
to the market. In reality, however, these recent entrants are not new firms established
for the sole purpose of participating in this particular market but often existing firms
that are attempting to expand their business or enter a new segment of the market.
Many firms participate in the procurement market as subcontractors before ac-
tively submitting bids as primary contractors. Participation in the market as sub-
contractors - hired by the primary contractor for specific tasks - can provide a way
to acquire bidding, negotiation or other relevant skills and resources. Serving as a
potential subcontractor to one or more firms increases the probability of carrying out
at least a portion of the project workload. While experience gained as a subcon-
tractor might be more limited in scope and task-specific, it can still be a valuable
stepping stone for firms that have only recently entered the market. This paper ex-
plores the significance of subcontractor experience accumulated before entering the
procurement auction market as a primary contractor and examines the effect of past
subcontracting experience on the future probability of success in the bidding process.
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The data studied here comes from the same government highway procurement
market in California as in Chapter 2, however, it considers an even earlier history of
a firm - prior to submitting a bid and being observed as a primary contractor. Firms
considering entering this market have a choice to bid independently (and possibly
subcontract part of the project to other firms, if they don’t have the necessary exper-
tise or resources), or to be listed as a subcontractor on a bid submitted by another
firm. While these two options are not mutually exclusive, and firms can potentially
participate in the same auction both as the primary contractor and a subcontractor
for another bidder, this situation is rarely observed in data.
3.1 Related Literature
While most of the attention in the literature on procurement auctions concen-
trates on the issue of bidders’ capacity constraints and its effects on procurement
costs and efficiency in the main market (Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003),1 Balat
(2013),2 Groeger (2013),3 Saini (2012)7), lately there has been a shift in focus to bring
subcontracting into the picture. The presence of subcontractors and the ability of
primary contractors to outsource tasks softens the effects of capacity constraints and
intensifies competition, since contractors facing unexpectedly high costs can use the
subcontracting market to effectively lower their costs. On the other hand, strategi-
cally behaving firms serving in both the main as well as the subcontracting markets
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can face increased opportunity costs of losing an auction if submitting and winning
a bid would imply a forgone opportunity to earn profit from subcontracting.
Jeziorski and Krasnokutskaya (2014)12 use a dynamic model to extend the lit-
erature on the effects of capacity constraints to the subcontracting market. They
consider a dynamic environment where contractors with capacity constraints can use
the subcontractor market to re-sell part of the awarded project. In their model con-
tractors’ costs vary stochastically but also depend on the level of prior commitments
(backlog) due to contractors’ capacity constraints. They find that in the environment
with subcontracting the burden of a larger projects is considerably reduced. Because
the availability of subcontracting slows down accumulation of backlog, it leads to
lower costs that in turn intensify competition in the market and reduce informational
rents. Since these effects result in lower mark-ups and lower prices, the procurement
costs are also lower than in an environment without subcontracting.
The literature on capacity constraints is mostly concerned with the primary con-
tractor’s decision to use the subcontracting market, and studies how the availability
of subcontracting affects the outcome of the auction and the primary contractor’s
cost distribution. In contrast, this paper considers the other side of the coin, which
includes the potential benefits of participating in the subcontracting market to the
subcontractor – rather than the primary contractor.
Several other papers develop theoretical models of subcontracting in static envi-
ronment. Wambach (2009)13 shows that if subcontracting happens before the contract
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is awarded, it matters how subcontractors are chosen by the primary contractors. If
subcontractors do not compete at different primary contractors they might take into
account the fact that they can influence the ultimate competitiveness of “their” pri-
mary contractor through the terms negotiated between them with regards to the
subcontracting work. Gale et al. (2000)14 study subcontracting in sequential static
procurement auctions with two symmetric bidders, and conclude that without the
possibility of subcontracting the auction outcome is generally inefficient.
This paper is more closely related to the empirical papers on subcontracting.
Miller (2014)15 considers a smaller set of 32 bridge projects to study the impact
of contractual incompleteness on subcontracting through ex-post revisions. Mar-
ion (2014)16 investigates the issue of horizontal subcontracting using auction data
from the California highway procurement market. He finds this occurs relatively
rarely, with only about 10% of projects receiving a bid from a firm that was also
listed as a subcontractor on another bid. He also examines the issues of affirma-
tive action and subcontracting with the purpose of satisfying requirements regarding
participation of disadvantaged businesses.
Perhaps the most related work by De Silva et al. (2011)17 examines past sub-
contracting experience on business duration in data on road construction projects
in Texas. The authors find that pre-entry experience in the form of early involve-
ment as subcontractor increases chances of survival. They attribute prolonged firm
duration to the lower risk subcontractor experience that improves firms’ competitive
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advantage.
3.2 Market Description
The market studied in this paper is the same as in Chapter 2, and consists of road
construction and repair projects awarded by the California Department of Trans-
portation (Caltrans) in repeated first-price sealed-bid auctions.
Interested potential bidders can request additional materials providing further
details on the location and description of the project and the bid letting date. The
government engineer also specifies the list of items and their corresponding quantities
required to complete the project, resulting in the engineer’s estimate of the overall
cost of the project.
Firms that decide to submit a bid are allowed to subcontract a portion1 of the
project to other firms (subcontractors) but must list on their bid all subcontractors
accounting for at more than 0.5 percent of the contract value or $10,000, whichever
is greater. Since bidders must provide the list of subcontractors as well as the price
for each item, negotiations with potential subcontractors are conducted prior to bid
submission and are completed before the outcome of the auction is realized.
As long as firms satisfy pre-qualification requirements, they are allowed to partic-
ipate in the same auction both as a bidders as well as a subcontractor, even though
1The minimum percentage of the project value required to be completed by the primary contractor
changes over time, together with the exact definition and inclusion of specialty projects. However,
it is generally on the order of 50%.
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this is not a common occurrence. Firms are also allowed to negotiate with multiple
bidders, and be listed as a subcontractor on several competing bids.
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
The data used in this paper covers the period from July 2003 through December
2009. During this period, there were 3,373 road and repair projects awarded, with
about 540 auctions per year, with the number of projects generally rising over time.
The dataset consists of variables capturing the size and complexity of the projects
(such as the engineer’s estimate, number of workdays, and number of items, source
of funding, location and type of project) together with a list of bids submitted for
each project, including the identity of all bidding firms and their corresponding bid
amounts. Furthermore, for each submitted bid (whether winning or losing) the data
contains a list of subcontractors pre-arranged to carry out certain tasks conditional
on the bidding firm being granted the project.
Overall, I observe 18,209 bids submitted by 1,079 different firms, with 5.4 bids
submitted per projects on average. 468 of these firms won at least one contract
during the period. On the subcontracting side, I observe 40,785 bidder-subcontractor
pairs, with about 12 subcontractors listed on average per bid. Overall, 4,814 firms
appear in the dataset during the period in the role of either subcontractor or bidder.
Many of the firms (3,735 firms, corresponding to 77.6% of all firms) only serve as
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subcontractors – these are firms that often specialize in a particular narrow field of
technical expertise, such as laying submarine cables or installing air-conditioning –
and these firms might not have the technical expertise and resources to manage and
carry out the whole project.
On the other hand, 612 (12.7%) firms are never listed as a subcontractor on
another firm’s bid, while the remaining 467 (10.7%) firms participate at least once as
a subcontractor on a bid, while also submit at least one bid independently during the
period. These are the firms of interest for which subcontracting can serve as another
way of obtaining valuable experience in the market, through familiarizing themselves
with the bidding process and bid preparation, and gaining experience in conducting
pre-bidding negotiations and satisfying government requirements. On some occasions,
the same firm participates in a particular auction both as an independent bidder as
well as a subcontractor, although this occurs in less than 5% of the data. Marion
(2014)16 investigates the issue of horizontal subcontracting in this market in more
detail.
In order to quantify the effects of subcontractor experience and investigate whether
this type of experience improve future prospects of firms in this market, I compare
bidders that enter this market without prior subcontracting experience with those
that enter as after participating in the role of a subcontractor. I use the initial 6
month of data to establish the pool of incumbent bidders, and categorize firms that
submit a bid for the first time after January 2004 as new entrants to the market.
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Table 3.1 provides descriptive information for entrants with and without subcon-
tracting. Firms with prior subcontracting experience participate on average more
frequently and win more often.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Recent Entrants by Subcontracting Expe-
rience
Bidders with prior Bidders without prior
subcontracting experience subcontracting experience
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Number of projects 33.1 113.1 - -
where listed as subcontractor
Number of winning bids 7.5 4.5 - -
where listed as subcontractor
Number of own bids 11.5 23.4 5.3 11.2
Number of own winning bids 2.1 5.3 0.8 2.3
Probability of winning 0.13 0.22 0.12 0.25
3.4 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis considers the question of the effect of past subcontractor
experience on the future success of bidders, and addresses this question by study-
ing firms as they enter the marketplace, with or without subcontracting experience.
First, I investigate whether participation in the role of a subcontractor improves fu-
ture chances of winning a project, and in particular, how does this effect depend on
the number of past successes as a subcontractor, and on the amount of prior subcon-
tracting work. Second, I examine the relationship between subcontracting experience
and the level of bids that firms submit in future auctions. Again, I consider both
66
CHAPTER 3. SUBCONTRACTOR EXPERIENCE
the effect of the number of instances as well as the amount of subcontracting work
performed in the past. I find that subcontracting experience improves the chances
of bidders to succeed in future auctions. Furthermore, more recent subcontracting
experience has a stronger effect than subcontracting experience further in the past.
3.4.1 Probability of Winning an Auction
In order to examine whether subcontractor experience has any lasting effect on the
future of firms in this marketplace, and to quantify this effect, I compare similar bid-
ders just entering the procurement market but differing in whether or not they have
previously participated in the subcontractor market. There are several dimensions
along which subcontracting experience could be measured: the number of bids (or
projects) on which a firm is listed as a subcontractor; the number of only the winning
bids on which a firm participates; or the dollar amount of work performed by the
subcontractor. These measures capture different benefits that might arise. For exam-
ple, the benefits of learning to negotiate prices accumulate from both successful and
unsuccessful bids, as negotiations have to be completed prior to bid submission. On
the other hand, construction cost reductions from learning-by-doing will only occur
when the bid is successful and the project is carried out. Hence, I consider a number
of different measures of subcontractor experience to capture a variety of gains that
could result from subcontractor experience.
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Table 3.2 presents the results of estimating a simple probit equation,
Probit(y|X, z) = α +X ′β + zγ
, regressing the dependent indicator variable for a winning bid y on the variable cap-
turing any prior subcontractor experience, z, and a set of controls, X, on the sample
of recent entrants. The control variables include project characteristics measuring
the size and duration of projects such as the engineer’s estimate and number of work-
days (both after logarithmic transformation); auction characteristics measuring the
competitiveness of the bidding environment such as the number of bidders and the
number of planholders2; all regressions also include a constants and a set of indicator
variables controlling for year and month effects.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable indicating prior
subcontractor experience suggests that firms with such experience are more likely to
win future auctions, even after controlling for the project characteristics. As might
be expected since the sample only includes firms that have not been participating in
the market for very long, these firms are less likely to win bidding for larger or more
complex projects (even though these effects are not significant). Similarly, bidding
against a larger number of competitors also decreases probability of winning. A less
straightforward result is the positive coefficient on the number of planholders, which
2Planholders are all firms that requested detail bidding materials on a particular project. Bidders
constitute a subset of the set of planholders, as not all planholders proceed to submit a bid.
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might indicate “popularity” of projects.
Table 3.2: Probability of Winning for Recent En-
trants
Dependent variable: Indicator for winner
Indicator for a bidder 0.082 **
with subcontractor experience (0.038)
Log (engineer’s estimate) −0.036 **
(0.016)
Number of planholders 0.014 ***
(0.003)
Number of bidders −0.099 ***
(0.007)
Log (number of workdays) 0.018
(0.017)
Year and month indicators Y
N 6,725
Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering by auction pro-
vided in parentheses. All specifications also include a con-
stant. Statistical significance: 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
Just as firms can accumulate subcontractor experience gradually as they perform
more projects, the relevant experience likely depreciates and become less valuable the
further away it from an event. Over time, employees with the appropriate human cap-
ital might leave, or relationships with other firms and subcontractors might weaken.
Since the data covers more than 5 years of auctions, in addition to the overall level of
past experience I also consider finer measures that focus on the months immediately
preceding a particular bid.
In Table 3.3, I consider the sample of recent entrants with subcontractor expe-
rience and examine three different measures. The first column uses the measure of
total subcontractor experience, constructed as the count of all prior winning bids on
which a firm was listed as a subcontractor. The second column limits the relevant
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window to the prior 12 months, and finally, the third column is the most restrictive,
only accounting for the prior 6 months.
More recent subcontracting experience has a stronger effect that experience ob-
tained further in the past. The positive and statistically significant coefficient indi-
cates that firms which served as subcontractors on a larger number of projects are
relatively more likely to win when submitting independent bids.
Table 3.3: Probability of Winning for Bidders with Subcontractor Experience
Dependent variable: Indicator for winner (1) (2) (3)
Number of all prior winning bids 0.002
on which listed as subcontractor (0.001)
Number of winning bids in the past 12 months 0.005 **
on which listed as subcontractor (0.002)
Number of winning bids in the past 6 months 0.013 **
on which listed as subcontractor (0.005)
Log (engineer’s estimate) −0.075 *** −0.072 *** −0.072 ***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Number of planholders 0.017 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of bidders −0.090 *** −0.088 *** −0.088 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Log (number of workdays) 0.008 0.011 0.012
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Year and month indicators Y Y Y
N 3,910 3,910 3,910
Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering by auction provided in parentheses. All specifications
also include a constant. Statistical significance: 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
The number of times that a firm has participated on projects as a subcontractor
is a somewhat crude measure of its subcontractor experience. While this measure will
capture benefits that accrue regardless of the project size, such as price negotiations,
it will disregard important benefits that depend on the size, complexity or duration
of a project. A subcontractor working on a small road repair will not gain the same
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experience as a subcontractor working on a construction of a new bridge. There-
fore, I also consider the dollar value of prior subcontracting work (after logarithmic
transformation).3
The results of a probit regression of the indicator for winning bid on the value of
prior subcontractor experience are presented in Table 3.4. Larger dollar amount of
past subcontracting work increases the future probability of winning an auction, and
this relationship is preserved even after controlling for the amount of work performed
as a primary contractor. The effects of the engineer’s estimate and the number of
competitors remain similar as before, when considering just the number of subcon-
tracting occasions. Overall, the effects of subcontracting experience on the future
probability of winning auctions suggest that the benefits of becoming familiar with
the market and the government bidding procedures exceeds the potential effects of ca-
pacity constraints. If the backlogs accumulated by these firms due to subcontracting
increased their construction costs for the foreseeable future, one would expect a neg-
ative effect on the probability of winning, and this effect would be more pronounced
the shorter the period preceding the auction.
3While some bids specify the exact items that a subcontractor is going to perform, other provide
limit detail. As an approximation, I construct the dollar value of work performed by a subcontractor
as if the work was split evenly among all subcontractors.
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Table 3.4: Probability of Winning for Bidders with Prior Subcon-
tractor Experience
Dependent variable: Indicator for winner (1) (2)
Log (value of prior subcontractor work) 0.017 * 0.016 *
(0.009) (0.009)
Log (value of winning bids) 0.019 ***
(0.004)
Log (engineer’s estimate) −0.077 *** −0.094 ***
(0.024) (0.025)
Number of planholders 0.017 *** 0.020 ***
(0.005) (0.005)
Number of bidders −0.090 *** −0.088 ***
(0.011) (0.011)
Log (number of workdays) 0.010 0.027
(0.025) (0.025)
Year and month indicators Y Y
N 3,910 3,910
Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering by auction provided in parenthe-
ses. All specifications also include a constant. Statistical significance: 1%(***),
5%(**), 10%(*).
3.4.2 Level of Bid Submitted in a an Auction
Besides the probability of winning an auction, a second relevant measure for com-
paring the success of firms with different history of subcontracting experience is the
level of their bids. In particular, the dependent variable that I use in the analysis
below is the dollar amount submitted by a bidding firm divided by the engineer’s esti-
mate. The government engineer computes the estimate based on the list of items that
need to be completed as well as the expected labor and material costs. The ability of
a firm to submit a lower bid relative to the engineer’s estimate will affect its proba-
bility of winning an auction, as these are first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions
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in which Caltrans awards the project to the lowest responsive qualified bidder.4
Similar to the analysis of probability of winning above, I start by comparing the
overall effect of subcontractor experience on the relative bid. Table 3.5 presents the
results of the OLS regression
bid/engineer’s estimate = α +X ′β + zγ + ε,
regressing the scaled bid on the variable indicating any past subcontracting experi-
ence, z, as well as the set of control variables contained in X. The results show that
firms with past subcontractor experience are able to submit lower bids as compared
to firms without any such experience, and this effect is statistically significant. Simi-
larly as before, presence of a larger number of competitors has a downward effect on
the relative bid, as firms need to compete more aggressively in order to win.
Focusing on recent entrants with subcontractor experience, I further investigate
the relationship between the number of times a firm has completed work as a sub-
contractor and its relative bid level. In Table 3.6, the number of past winning bids
on which a firm has been listed as a subcontractor has again been measured in three
different ways: first, as the total number of events in the past; the number of events in
the prior year; and the number of events in the prior 6 months. While subcontractor
4Depending on the source of funding and the time period, bidders can face additional requirements
or goals such as sufficient participation of Disabled Veteran Business Enterprise firms on the contract.
Some firms can receive an advantage through the small business bid preference program, which I
studied in detail in Chapter 2. Marion has also examined affirmative action in auctions.
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Table 3.5: Bid Amount Relative to Engineer’s Esti-
mate for Recent Entrants
Dependent variable: Bid/Engineer’s estimate
Indicator for bidder −0.048 ***
with subcontractor experience (0.007)
Number of planholders 0.002 **
(0.001)
Number of bidders −0.011 ***
(0.002)
Log (number of workdays) −0.002
(0.006)
Year and month indicators Y
N 6,725
Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering by auction are
provided in parentheses. All specifications also include a constant.
Statistical significance: 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
experience over the whole history of firm does not seem to have an effect on the bid,
the recent experience has a significant negative effect, with the effect being stronger
for the most recent experience.
Analogous to the study of probability of winning conducted earlier, I also examine
the dollar value of past subcontractor experience. The pattern of this relationship
again reveals that the amount of prior work performed in relatively recent past has a
significantly negative effect on scaled bid. However, this time the effect is strongest
when considering the full year prior to bidding, which suggests that firms performing
subcontracting work in the recent past might be facing higher cost, which would tend
to put upward pressure on their bids and counteract the benefits of obtaining such
experience.
Overall, the analysis above has consistently shown that among firms entering this
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Table 3.6: Bid Amount Relative to Engineer’s Estimate for Recent Entrants with
Subcontractor Experience
Dependent variable: Bid/Engineer’s estimate (1) (2) (3)
Number of all prior winning bids 0.000
on which listed as subcontractor (0.000)
Number of winning bids in the past 12 months −0.003 ***
on which listed as subcontractor (0.001)
Number of winning bids in the past 6 months −0.006 ***
on which listed as subcontractor (0.001)
Number of planholders 0.003 ** 0.002 * 0.002 *
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of bidders −0.011 *** −0.012 *** −0.012 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log (number of workdays) 0.007 0.005 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Year and month indicators Y Y Y
N 3,910 3,910 3,910
Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering by auction provided in parentheses. All specifications
also include a constant. Statistical significance: 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
Table 3.7: Bid Amount Relative to Engineer’s Estimate for Recent Entrants with
Subcontractor Experience
Dependent variable: Bid/Engineer’s estimate (1) (2) (3)
Log (value of all prior subcontractor work) −0.002
(0.001)
Log (value of subcontractor work −0.003 ***
in the past 12 months) (0.001)
Log (value of subcontractor work −0.002 ***
in the past 6 months) (0.001)
Number of planholders 0.003 ** 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of bidders −0.011 *** −0.011 *** −0.011 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log (number of workdays) 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Year and month indicators Y Y Y
N 3,910 3,910 3,910
Note: Standard errors corrected for clustering by auction provided in parentheses. All specifications
also include a constant. Statistical significance: 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*).
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market having subcontractor experience is associated with an increased probability
of winning an auction and with lower bid relative to the engineer’s estimate. These
effects tend to be more pronounced in both magnitude and significance for the most
recent experience, despite the possibility that firms participating on winning con-
tracts shortly before submitting a bid might be facing higher costs due to increased
backlog. Furthermore, both the number of past occasions on which a firm performed
subcontracting work as well as the dollar value of the work seem to be informative.
This might be related to the fact that subcontracting experience brings about bene-
fits along various dimensions, including price negotiations, project coordination and
management, or labor and material acquisition. While some of these benefits accu-
mulate regardless of project size, others will tend to increase with the scale of the
task.
Note that the analysis above does not attempt to explain firms’ participation
decisions, whether with respect to the decision to participate in the subcontractor
market or to submit a bid. While these decision can be in part driven by the costs
that firms face at a given point in time, and thus depend on the level of backlog, firms
are likely taking into account many other factors, such as options available outside
the government procurement process. Such factors are difficult to measure and are
not available in the current dataset.
76
CHAPTER 3. SUBCONTRACTOR EXPERIENCE
3.5 Conclusion
Despite a number of government programs in place to help firms establish them-
selves and remain in the procurement market for construction projects, bidder learn-
ing has garnered limited attention. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I presented
evidence on learning-by-doing in the Caltrans procurement auction market suggest-
ing that previous bidding experience plays an important role in the future success
of recent entrants. I showed that as firms submit successful bids and accumulate
experience, they slide down the learning curve and achieve average costs below those
of inexperienced firms.
However, many firms participate in the closely intertwined subcontracting market
either before or while actively submitting bids as primary contractors. Modeling the
entire decision that such firms face would be a complex endeavor: not only do firms
have to decide whether or not to submit a bid, and at what level but also whether or
not to be listed as a subcontractor on one or more competitors’ bids, and what price
to negotiate for the pertinent tasks.
Firms in this situation face important tradeoff: serving as a potential subcontrac-
tor to one or more firms increases the probability of participating on the winning bid
and carrying out at least a portion of the project workload; on the other hand, choos-
ing to submit its own bid and not serve as a potential subcontractor might provide a
cost advantage in bidding if the alternative subcontractors would be more costly to
the competitors.
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The decision gets even more involved in presence of learning-by-doing. If perform-
ing subcontracting work brings about long-run benefits the extend into the future and
provide the subcontractor with a competitive advantage in subsequent auctions, the
firm might find it optimal to participate in the subcontracting market prior to inde-
pendent bidding.
While experience gained as a subcontractor is more limited in scope and task-
specific, the empirical analysis in this chapter has shown that it can be a valuable





The clustering pattern of trade between countries has puzzled economists for a
long time. Several theories have been proposed to explain this pattern, with gravity
theory gaining the most attention. Gravity theory asserts that the volume of trade
between countries is inversely proportional to the distance between these countries.
Informally, this means that countries located geographically close to each other tend
to trade more. The obvious rationale for this regularity is that since transaction costs
are related to the distance close proximity implies lower trading costs.
We re-examine this issue using data from an online market for programming ser-
vices. The market is organized around an online platform that allows buyers to solicit
price quotes for their programming projects from a large number of affiliated sellers.
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This market is international in nature: the buyers and sellers participating come from
many different countries. At the same time, physical transaction costs are relatively
low and should in theory be the same across buyer-seller country pairs.
We begin by presenting descriptive evidence documenting the clustering patterns
in this online market. We then proceed to build and estimate a model that rationalizes
project allocation decisions by allowing the distribution of buyers’ tastes for sellers’
attributes to vary across buyer countries while remaining constant across seller coun-
tries; similarly, this model allows for sellers’ attributes to differ across seller countries
but restricts them to remain constant across buyer countries. That is, our model
does not allow for bilateral preferences. We use the estimation results to evaluate the
importance of various potential channels that might contribute to clustering.
Transactions in this market are implemented in the form of multi-attribute auc-
tions that allow buyers to deviate from allocation based solely on price (as is the case
in standard auctions) in favor of service providers who are associated with higher
buyer-specific value. We formalize the features of this market in a model where each
project attracts a set of sellers who submit bids for buyer’s consideration. The project
is awarded to the seller who delivers the highest value over price as long as it exceeds
buyer’s outside option; otherwise, the project is not awarded. We model buyers’ val-
ues as represented by the sum of a systematic component (seller’s quality), which is
the same for all buyers, and a stochastic buyer-seller-specific match component. We
additionally allow for both strategic pricing and participation decisions of sellers.
80
CHAPTER 4. TRADING ACROSS BORDERS IN ONLINE AUCTIONS
We exploit the structure of our model to decompose observed clustering patterns
of trade into various contributing components. We begin by separating the patterns
associated with buyers’ allocation decisions from those associated with sellers’ par-
ticipation decisions. Indeed, if the allocation decisions of a certain group of buyers
demonstrate preference for a particular type of seller, this pattern may be further
reinforced by the participation decisions of sellers aware of this preference. First, we
isolate the allocation patterns based on buyers’ decisions by eliminating differences in
participation behavior. We then further evaluate the importance of buyers’ weights,
which are uniform across seller countries, relative to sellers’ attributes, which are uni-
form across buyer countries. This analysis provides an insight into the nature of the
“attraction” between particular sellers and buyers.
Our estimation methodology is tailored to accommodate the features of data that
typically arise in service markets, and in the online service market especially. We
have to specifically address the following features: (a) in this market, buyers are
able to obtain a well-informed assessment of seller’s quality through interpersonal
communication and by reviewing examples of previous work; since such information
is not available to the researcher, the buyer is likely to be better informed about seller’s
quality than the researcher; it is thus important to account in the analysis for the
unobserved heterogeneity among sellers; (b) the rules applied by buyers to allocate
their projects are not observed by the researcher and thus have to be modeled as
random coefficients; (c) the choice set in this market tends to be buyer-specific; this
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complicates the analysis because the standard discrete choice methodologies rely on
the fact that the probability of choosing a given individual option conditional on
buyer’s choice set can be precisely estimated from data – this property does not hold
in our environment; (d) a large number of sellers stay in this market only for a brief
period of time (transitory sellers).
We assume that transitory sellers are not able to provide buyers with extensive in-
formation about their qualities due to their short experience with the online platform.
The buyer, therefore, evaluates transitory sellers on the basis of an average quality
typical for such seller’s country. In contrast, we assume that the quality of permanent
sellers is fully observed by buyers. The large number of permanent sellers does not
allow us to estimate quality at the level of the individual seller. Instead, we rely on
the classification procedure proposed in Krasnokutskaya et al. (2014)18 to recover
the quality group structure for the set of permanent sellers. This procedure identifies
sets of sellers that are characterized by equal quality levels, and thus substantially
reduces the number of parameters that need to be recovered in estimation (each group
of sellers is associated with the same quality level). We rely on the private variation
in sellers’ costs that remains after conditioning on sellers’ characteristics to identify
weights used by buyers in the allocation process.
We find that our model fits data quite well and is capable of explaining 80-90%
of the magnitude of clustering observed in the data. Thus, bilateral preferences ap-
pear to play a limited role in this market. Furthermore, we establish that buyers’
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preferences for sellers’ attributes are significantly reinforced by strategic participation
which amplifies certain buyers’ apparent preference for sellers from specific countries.
In particular, sellers from any given country choose to participate more often with
buyers who appear to give preference to their country. Finally, we decompose cluster-
ing in buyers’ choices as accounted for by the heterogeneity in various seller attributes,
such as the average reputation score, quality, and cost. We find that among the con-
sidered attributes differences in sellers’ costs contribute most to the generation of the
clustering pattern. Cost differences translate directly into price differences and when
compounded by the differences in buyers’ price sensitivity they become a significant
source of the clustering allocation pattern.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 summarizes the relevant literature,
whereas Section 4.2 describes the market; the model is developed in Section 4.3.
Section 4.4 discusses the empirical methodology, followed by Section 4.5 describing the
data and Section 4.6 presenting the results of the descriptive analysis. The estimation
results are provided in Section 4.7; Section 4.9 outlines the results of the clustering
decomposition. Section 4.10 summarizes the findings.
4.1 Related Literature
Patterns of inter-country trade in physical goods have long been documented in
the international trade literature (e.g. Dornbusch et al. (1977),19 Bergstrand (1989),20
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Krugman (1991)21). Empirical analyses in this line of research have identified vari-
ables such as geographic proximity, shared borders, former colonial relationships, and
common language as some of the important drivers of trade.
However, with the rise of the internet and global communication networks trade is
no longer restricted to the physical networks of highways and shipping routes (Leamer
and Storper (2001)22). Trading in professional services is becoming increasingly preva-
lent, with numerous examples in software development, evaluation of insurance claims,
or provision of customer support. While the importance of historical relationships
between countries will likely continue to drive patterns of trade, information and
communications technology will erase many borders and put more weight on skills
relevant in the markets for professional services. So far, however, there is little empir-
ical evidence documenting these new trade patterns. Our work relates to two streams
of prior literature: models explaining patterns of global trade and multi-attribute
auction theory.
Many empirical studies analyzing bilateral trade flows have found the intensity of
trade to be inversely related to the distance between the trade partners (Tinbergen
(1962),23 Poyhonen (1963),24 Linnemann (1966)25). Moreover, the amount of trade
is found to increase proportionally to the product of the GDPs of the two countries,
with this relationship remaining remarkably robust across time as well as across dif-
ferent countries. This pattern of trade strongly resembles Newtonian physics, which
postulates that the force between two objects is proportional to the product of the
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two masses divided by the square of the distance between the objects. For this reason,
it is often referred to as gravity theory, and the basic model characterizes trade flows
between countries i and j by the following equation
Trade Flowij = α ∗ (GDPi ∗GDPj)/distance(i, j).
Several empirical papers have augmented the basic gravity model to allow for ef-
fects of common borders (McCallum (1995)26), common language, former colonial
relationships, and exchange rates (Frankel (1994)27).
In the market for online programming services that we analyze in this chapter,
seller attributes other than price may affect buyer’s choice of a provider. For this
reason, our work also relates to a second stream of literature on multi-attribute auc-
tions. Such auctions are commonly used in the procurement of non-homogeneous
goods, where other attributes besides price such as quality or performance play a role
in the allocation of the auction (such as procurement of a new weapons systems by
the Department of Defense).
Unlike scoring auctions, analyzed by Laffont and Tirole (1987),28 McAfee and
McMillan (1987),29 Che (1993),30 and more recently by Asker and Cantillion (2006),31
multi-attribute auctions have received relatively little attention in the literature. In
contrast to a scoring rule auction, bidders participating in a multi-attribute auction
cannot specify or choose characteristics of their services. Instead, buyers take into ac-
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count long-run bidder characteristics that are not meant to be altered for the purpose
of a specific auction. In addition, buyers in multi-attribute auctions do not announce
the weights attached to different bidder characteristics.
Finally, the work most closely related to our paper is by Greenstein (1993).32
Greenstein models and estimates the choice process of government computer pro-
curement using a multinomial logit model of vendor choice. The probability of a
contract being awarded is modeled as a function of a representative of the vendor
being present at the corresponding government agency office, the extent of previous
buyer-vendor interaction (including the installed base) and other compatibility re-
lated factors. The results establish a strong incumbent bias - even after controlling
for factors capturing the vendor-buyer match, the buyer is much more likely to award
the deal to its previous vendor.
4.2 Market Description
This paper studies an online market for programming services, in which a platform
serves as an intermediary between buyers (the demand side) and potential sellers (the
supply side). Buyers procure programming services such as platform programming,
databases, graphics programming and website design by posting job announcements
to which interested sellers can respond by submitting a quote for a price at which
they would be willing to complete the task. While the majority of sellers attracted
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by this online market come from North America, Eastern Europe, and South and
East Asia, the market serves buyers from a variety of countries around the world by
providing them access to a diverse set of sellers who differ in cost and quality.
The intermediary company allocates jobs through multi-attribute auctions, allow-
ing buyers to take into account multiple seller characteristics in addition to the price
quote. As a result, the selected seller is not necessarily the one who submits the
lowest quote, reflecting the importance of quality in addition to the cost of providing
a service. An important feature of this allocation mechanism is that the award rule
is not announced and thus remains unknown to other market participants.
The registry provides limited information on verifiable “outside” credentials as
well as information about the on-site performance of the seller. The latter includes a
history of performance-related measures such as reputation scores or ratings, buyers’
numerical feedback about working with a given seller, as well as instances of delays
and disputes. In the case of a dispute, the company provides professional arbitration
services that ensure that a seller is paid if only if the completed job satisfies industry
standards.
Sellers often communicate with buyers before posting price quotes, with an average
of three messages exchanged between a seller and a buyer prior to submitting a price
quote. Sellers can also attach an example of previous work or a sketch of the proposed
code. The frequency and content of this communication are not observed by the
other sellers. Hence, while the buyer has an opportunity to form an opinion about
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each seller’s quality, competing sellers have much more limited knowledge of their
competitors’ levels of quality. In principle, competitors can infer seller’s quality from
his long-run rate of winning.
When a seller contacts a buyer for any reason, his code name appears on the
project webpage. Therefore, at any point in time, a visitor to the page can see the
list of all sellers who have contacted the buyer up to that point. This list generally does
not coincide with the set of sellers who eventually submit price quotes, since sellers
can contact buyers without submitting a quote. The list of sellers who have contacted
a buyer likely reflects potential rather than actual competition in an auction, meaning
that prospective sellers do not observe the exact set of their competitors.
Finally, most of the buyers in our dataset appear only once in this market. On the
other hand, a large number of sellers stay in the market for a long time (permanent
sellers), whereas a considerable fraction participate only in a few auctions before
leaving the market (transitory sellers).
4.3 Model
The demand side of this market for programming services is represented by one-
time buyers. Each buyer brings a single project to the market and seeks to hire a
service provider who would complete the job. Project l is summarized by a set of
characteristics, zl, such as the date when the project is posted, and the contract terms
88
CHAPTER 4. TRADING ACROSS BORDERS IN ONLINE AUCTIONS
(e.g., specification of the programming tasks, deadlines, etc.).1 The buyer posts the
description of the project and invites sellers to submit price quotes for the project.
The supply side of the market consists of sellers who are described by a vectors
of characteristics, x, and a scalar characteristic, q, which admits a finite number of
values, q1 < q2 < ··· < qK . We assume that characteristic q is vertical (or quality-like)
in nature. Non-quality characteristics capture sellers’ countries of origin as well as
their recorded performance measures such as reputation scores, delays or instances of
conflict. Sellers can be of two types: permanent, i.e. those who stay with the market
for a long time; and transitory, who participate in the market only for a short time
and leave after completing one or two projects.
4.3.1 Project Allocation
Buyers allocate projects through multi-attribute auctions that allow them to de-
viate from allocation based solely on price (as in standard auctions) in favor of service
providers who are associated with higher buyer-specific value. We use Al to denote
the set of sellers who submit a bid for project l and refer to such sellers as active
bidders. These sellers form the buyer’s choice set.
Extensive communication between buyers and sellers as well the record of sellers’
performance measures provided by the platform allows buyers to be well-informed
about permanent sellers’ attributes. We allow, however, that a researcher may not
1We use l to index a buyer as well as the job he posted.
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observe permanent sellers’ vertical characteristic q. Furthermore, both the researcher
and the buyer are not informed about the vertical characteristic of transitory sellers
(possibly because a seller does not have enough information to provide to the buyer).
Buyer l associates a (private) value, ∆l,i, with an active seller i ∈ Al and awards
his project to the active seller with the highest level of ∆l,i − bl,i if this level exceeds
buyer’s outside option U0,l; otherwise, he leaves the project unassigned. The buyer’s
value is a weighted average of seller’s attributes with buyer-specific weights αl, βl and
intercept εi,l (the residual value assigned by buyer to a match with a specific seller),
i.e.,
∆i,l = αlq̃
k(i)(xi) + xiβl + εi,l, (4.1)
where q̃ refers to the residual quality after the mean quality associated with observed
characteristics, xiβl, is netted out. We let εl = {ε1,l, ...ε|A|,l} and refer to (αl, εl) as
the vector of buyers’ weights.
Note, that in the case when βl is constant across buyers the expression for ∆i,l
can be re-written as
∆i,l = αlq
k(i)(xi) + εi,l. (4.2)
In keeping with the definition of a multi-attribute auction, sellers do not observe
the weights or the outside option of a specific buyer and consider them to be a random
draw from some joint distribution of weights and outside options characterizing the
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population of buyers.2
4.3.2 Seller’s Strategies
Let Nl denote the set of potential bidders for a given auction l. This set is
partitioned into subsets of permanent and transitory sellers, N = Np ∪ N t. Recall
that a buyer is informed about the full vector of permanent sellers’ characteristics
and of transitory sellers’ x and E[q|x].
During an auction for project l each potential bidder i observes some private
signal, or entry costs, Ei,l, drawn from the distribution FE(.|(xi, qi)) and is aware of
Nl. More specifically, seller i’s information set consists of Ei,l and IN,l, where the
latter contains information on the number of potential permanent bidders by quality
group, and the total number of potential transitory bidders. Given this information
set, potential bidder i decides whether to participate in the auction or not. His entry
strategy σEi is a mapping from the supports of Ei,l and IN,l into {0, 1}. We denote
the entry decision (outcome) by Di,l (Di,l = 1 if enters and Di,l = 0 otherwise).
Upon entry, an active bidder observes a private cost Ci,l ∈ R+ for completing the
project. The cost of seller i characterized by (x, q) is distributed according to F kC(·).
2Unobservability of εl,i rules out common (or even correlated between buyer and seller) under-
standing of the specific seller’s suitability for a given project. This may appear to be restrictive in
view of the extensive interaction between buyers and sellers. However, from the theoretical point
of view, this component controls the size of (unsystematic part of) surplus generated by the spe-
cific buyer-seller match. The simulated solution of the game where εl,i is known indicates that the
knowledge of εl,i allows bidders to extract a larger part of surplus. Thus, it is not in the interest
of the buyer to share any information that would reveal εl,i to seller i. More specifically, the inter-
view should be conducted in such a way as to elicit maximum information about seller’s suitability
without revealing the match value to the seller.
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The bidder does not observe participation decisions of other potential bidders, and is
thus unaware of the composition of the set of active bidders. He then submit a price
Bi,l based on his information set.
In line with the existing empirical auction literature, we assume that the ob-
served outcomes reflect a type-symmetric pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(psBNE).3 In such an equilibrium, participants who are ex ante identical (i.e. either
“i, j ∈ Npl and qi = qj, and xi = xj” or “i, j ∈ N tl and xi = xj”) adopt the same
strategies. The bidding strategy for seller i who is characterized by (x, q) is denoted
σr,(x,q) : [c, c] → R+, and entrant i’s expected profit from bidding b, i.e. submitting
σr,(x,q)(c) = b when the cost draw is equal to c is given by
Πr,(x,q)(b, c; σ−i) ≡ (b− c) Pr(iwins | b, i ∈ (x, q);σ−i),
where σ−i denotes a profile of other sellers’ strategies that they would use should they
become active in a given project, and Pr(iwins | b, i ∈ (x, q);σ−i) the probability of
seller i winning the auction by bidding b with the other active sellers’ bids consistent
with the strategies σ−i. Notice that expression in Pr(iwins | b, i ∈ (x, q);σ−i) im-
plicitly includes integration over possible sets of active competitors since information
about active competitors is not available to seller i at the time when he decides on
3We abstract away from sellers’ dynamic incentives associated with reputation building. This as-
sumption does not impact the methodology for the estimation of buyers’ weights or sellers’ qualities.
We provide detailed discussion of this issue in the empirical section of this paper when we recover
the distribution of sellers’ costs.
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his bid.
Thus, a psBNE 4 is a profile of strategies {σr,(x,q)}r∈{p,t},q∈{q1,...,qK} such that
σr,(x,q)(c) = arg maxb Π
r,(x,q)(b, c; σ−i) for all c.
4.4 Empirical Methodology
The large number of buyers and sellers participating in this market, sellers’ self-
selection into buyer-specific choice sets, as well as potential unobservability of some of
the sellers’ attributes make use of standard discrete choice techniques impractical in
this setting. Instead, we rely on the two-step methodology developed in Krasnokut-
skaya et al. (2014)18 which in the first step recovers sellers’ groupings according to the
unobserved (discrete) characteristic and then in the second step implements GMM
procedure to recover sellers’ quality levels and the distribution of buyers’ weights. We
summarize the details of the estimation procedure in this section.
4.4.1 Step 1: Classification Procedure
Recall that each seller i is characterized by a vector of observable characteristics
Xi and a scalar measure of quality qi which is not observed in the data. We allow
for the distribution of q to be x-dependent, i.e. to vary with x. Then, the support
4See Krasnokutskaya et al. (2014)18 for the proof of existence of such equilibrium.
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of the distribution of qualities among sellers with Xi = x is given by {qk(x) : 1 ≤
k ≤ Kx} where Kx is the cardinality of the support given x. Characteristics (x, q)
induce partitioning of the set of sellers into a finite collection of groups, {S(x,q)},
corresponding to different values of x and q and such that sellers within a group are
characterized by the same value of x and q.5 The first step of our procedure exploits
the differences in the probability of winning across sellers of different groups to recover
the group structure of the set of permanent sellers. The classification procedure is
implemented conditional on the value of observable characteristic x. That is why in
what follows we suppress reference to x and focus only on sellers’ differences in q.
In this step, we make use of a non-parametric classification procedure proposed
in Krasnokutskaya et al. (2014).18 This procedure is based on the pairwise testing
of inequality restrictions which relies on the proposition below. It exploits differences
in the probability of winning across sellers with different levels of the unobserved
characteristic.
Intuitively, if i and j participate in two separate but ex-ante identical auctions (in
terms of the realized set of competitors) and submit the same price then the seller
with the higher value of q has a higher chance of winning. Note that the winner is not
deterministic in the presence of uncertainty about buyers’ weights. The ranking of
winning probabilities is preserved when aggregated over different sets of competitors
as long as the probability of encountering a given set of competitors is the same for
5Such partition arises naturally when x and q are discrete. It requires discretizing xs if they are
continuous.
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both sellers. This condition holds if, for example, the pool from which competitors
are drawn does not include either i or j.
To formulate the result more formally we need the following two assumptions:
(A1) Sellers’ private costs Ci,l and the events of being active are independent across
all i ∈ S and across l. For each seller i with qi = qk, his cost in each auction
is an independent draw from continuous distribution F kC with a density positive
over support [ck, ck].
6 The events of being active are independent across projects
and sellers.
(A2) The three random vectors (αl, U0,l), εl and Cl are mutually independent; match
components εi,l are i.i.d. across i’s; and εi,l and (αl, U0,l) are continuously dis-
tributed with a density positive over [ε, ε] and over [0, α]× [u0, u0] respectively.7
For the remainder of this section we drop subscript l (rhw index for auctions/buyers)
to simplify notation. Let Bi denote the support of prices submitted by seller i in a
psBNE. For any b ∈ Bi ∩ Bj, define a pair-specific index:
ri,j(b) ≡ Pr(iwins | Bi = b, i ∈ A, j 6∈ A). (4.3)
6This assumption does not allow for a persistent unobserved seller-specific cost component in
addition to quality. This excludes, for example, differences in opportunity costs associated with
sellers’ location (e.g. urban vs. rural) if it is not observed in the data. It might be possible
to separately account for this type of unobserved seller heterogeneity since our current strategy
identifies unobserved quality from buyers’ choices whereas unobserved cost persistence might be
identified from the additional correlation in prices (unaccounted for by quality) over time. We leave
this extension to future research.
7Notice that we require that εl is orthogonal to (αl, U0,l), whereas αl and U0,l are allowed to be
dependent. Such restriction appears to be plausible since we can think of αl and U0,l as buyers’
permanent tastes whereas εl characterizes active sellers’ idiosyncratic suitabilities for the project
which should not be related to buyer’s outside option.
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This index reflects the probability that seller i wins an auction when submitting bid
b and when the set of his direct competitors does not include j. The proposition
below establishes pairwise ranking of bidders i and j on the basis of indices ri,j(b)
and rj,i(b).
8,9
Proposition 1 Under (A1)-(A2),
sign(ri,j(b)− rj,i(b)) = sign(qi − qj)
for any pair of permanent sellers i, j and all b in the interior of Bi ∩ Bj.10
Since in our model sellers’ ordering with respect to q is transitive this result applied
to a sufficiently large dataset allows arranging all sellers in the order of (weakly)
increasing quality. In other words, we are able to identify the quality group structure
and group affiliations of permanent sellers.
The main issue that we need to overcome in order to translate this identification
strategy into a viable estimation method is that, while ordering with respect to q
is transitive in our model, the estimation based on pairwise comparisons may result
in estimates that violate transitivity in small samples, even when there are only two
quality groups in the population.
8The index with restriction {i, j ∈ A} is not monotone in bidders’ quality. In fact, under such
restriction the ranking of ri,j(b) and rj,i(b) depends on the distributions of buyers’ weights.
9Proposition 1 also holds if we relax (A2) to allow dependence between α and ε and only require
εi to be independent conditional on α.
10Here sign(x) ≡ 1{x > 0} − 1{x < 0} for all x ∈ R.
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The nonparametric classification procedure we use proposes a method to estimate
the whole group structure at once in a way that satisfies transitivity. Below, we
provide a heuristic summary of how this is achieved in a simple case of two groups
(corresponding to high and low values of q).
The idea is to divide the set of sellers into two groups such that sellers within each
group are “closer” to each other than to sellers from the other group according to
some metric which is based on index ri,j. More specifically, for each seller i, we first
divide the other sellers into two groups, one with sellers more likely to have higher
quality than i and the other with sellers more likely to have lower quality than i.
This division is implemented by comparing p-values from a pairwise bootstrap test of
the inequality restrictions ri,j(b) ≥ rj,i(b) for all b. Next, we check whether seller i is
more likely to belong to the first group or to the second group. Thus for each seller i,
we estimate a separate group structure. We choose one of these structures to be our
estimate of the underlying quality group structure so that the chosen structure has
most empirical support (in terms of average p-values). The formal exposition of the
classification method for a more general case of multiple quality groups can be found
in Krasnokutskaya et al. (2014).18
The true number of the quality groups is usually unknown. Thus in estimation
we use a consistent group number selection procedure which utilizes the following
regularity.11 When the sample size is large, misspecifying the number of quality
11The fact that the number of groups is recovered from data ensures that the assumption of quality
discreteness is not overly restrictive. Indeed, any continuous distribution can be approximated
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groups to be smaller than the true number of groups results in the weak empirical
support of seller homogeneity for some of the estimated groups. On the other hand,
when the number of quality groups is misspecified to be larger than or equal to the true
number of groups, the group estimation does not show any sign of misspecification
bias.
Note that once the quality group affiliations of sellers are known their identities
are no longer important. For example, to condition on the realization of the set of
active bidders no longer means to fix the list of bidders identities. Rather, it means to
require that the set of active bidders should include specific numbers of sellers by type
and quality group. Note that the quality group affiliation is not publicly observed
for transitory sellers and thus only information on the overall number of transitory
active bidders should be specified. In what follows we will use notation IA to reflect
such information about a given set of sellers A.
4.4.2 Step 2: GMM Estimation
The estimation is based on two sets of moment conditions. The first set of mo-
ments relates the probability that a permanent seller wins when the sets of actual
and potential permanent bidders satisfy certain restrictions. The second set links
by a sequence of discrete distributions with finite supports. Therefore, one can obtain as good
approximation of the continuous distribution of qualities by a discrete random variable as information
in the data would allow if the support of the discrete random variable is not restricted. Note that
modeling unobserved heterogeneity using a discrete distribution is common in empirical studies. For
examples, see Heckman and Singer (1984),33 Keane and Wolpin (1997),34 and Crawford and Shum
(2005)35 to name just a few.
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transitory and permanent sellers’ empirical distribution of bids and participation fre-
quencies to their theoretical counterparts.
The first set of moments consists of three subsets:
(1a) Moments that are based on permanent seller’s probability of winning in an auc-
tion where two or more active permanent bidders belong to the same group. In
these moment conditions, we compute expectations of the following functions:
a constant (equal to one), the difference between the winning bid and a bid sub-
mitted by a permanent bidder from the same group, and the squared difference
between the winning bid and a bid submitted by a bidder from the same group.
(1b) Moments that are based on the permanent seller’s probability of winning in an
auction where he competes with one or more active permanent bidders belonging
to a different group. In these moment conditions, we compute expectations
of the following functions: a constant (equal to one), the difference between
the winning bid and a bid submitted by a seller from a different group, the
squared difference between the winning bid and a bid submitted by a seller
from a different group, respectively. We include moments for all possible pairs
of different groups.
(1c) Moments that are based on the permanent seller’s probability of winning in an
auction where he competes with one or more active permanent bidders belonging
to a different group, and at least one transitory active bidder belonging to a
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specific country group. In these moment conditions, we compute expectations
of the following functions: the product of transitory bid and the differences
between the winning bid and the bid of a permanent seller from a different group,
the product of transitory bidder’s characteristics other than price (e.g., the
number of available scores, and a current average of scores) and the differences
between the winning bid and the bid of a permanent seller from a different
group. We include moments for all possible pairs of different permanent sellers’
groups and all possible country groups of transitory sellers.
We supplement moment conditions in the first set by the following moment con-
dition:
(1d) The probability that project is not allocated.
The second set of moments matches the following empirical moments to their
theoretical counterparts: the mean and the variance of the transitory bid distribu-
tions, as well as the frequencies with which potential transitory sellers submit a bid
aggregated to the level observed in the data. We include such moments for every
permanent seller group, or correspondingly every combination of transitory seller’s
country group, the number of his ratings and the current average of his reputation
scores. We additionally imposed the expected profit conditions that summarize the
optimal participation decision of transitory bidders for each group of transitory sell-
ers. These conditions impose the restriction that in equilibrium only potential bidders
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with entry costs below the ax-ante expected profit should participate.12
4.5 The Data
The data covers the initial 6 years of the company’s operations in the online mar-
ket for programming services, and contains information on close to 600,000 projects
involving participation of around 50,000 different sellers. For every project, we ob-
serve the type of work, the approximate size of the project, the time requirements,
and the geographic location of the buyer. We also observe all submitted bids and the
geographic locations of all bidders, as well as the identity of the winner and measures
of the winner’s subsequent performance, such as arbitration or delays.
The projects range in type and size from very small (below $100) to larger ones
(above $1,000), and typically last fewer than three weeks. Projects can include specific
requirements, such as a need to use a particular programming language. The median
number of bids submitted per project is six. The majority of buyers are one-time
participants, with fewer than 2% of them returning for another project. Therefore,
buyers rarely interact with the same seller more than once. Krasnokutskaya et al.
(2014)18 provide additional details describing the dataset.
Due to sample size considerations, we focus on graphics-related programming
projects of medium size (between $200 to $700). Projects of this type involve pro-
12The identifying assumption here is that the distribution of the costs of entry is the same for all
groups.
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gramming computer games, computer-generated animation, and media-related pro-
gramming. For each seller we discard the first year of his tenure and only use obser-
vations that correspond to the later years of his career with the online market.
Following the methodology developed in Krasnokutskaya et al. (2014),18 we cat-
egorize permanent sellers as those with tenure longer than one year and transitory
sellers as those with tenure less than one year. Tenure is defined as the length of time
elapsed between the dates of seller’s first and last bid. We apply the classification
algorithm to allocate permanent sellers into unobservable quality groups. The clas-
sification algorithm allows sellers to differ in quality, with the buyers assumed to be
able to observe only permanent sellers’ levels of quality.
Sellers’ observable characteristics used in the empirical analysis consist of country
affiliation and average score (for permanent bidders only). Seller’s country affiliation
may provide a measure of convenience due to time difference, language proficiency, or
work attitude. Sellers are grouped by geographic proximity and similarity of language
and economic conditions into the following seven groups: North America (USA and
Canada), Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa,
South and East Asia, Australia (grouped with New Zealand). Majority of sellers
originates from either North America, Eastern Europe or South and East Asia, making
these three country groups the focus of our analysis.
In a similar approach buyers are also grouped by geographic proximity and the
analysis focuses on the seven largest groups: North America (USA and Canada),
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United Kingdom, Western Europe13, Southern Europe14, Eastern Europe15 , Ocea-
nia (Australia and New Zealand), and South and East Asia (India, Pakistan, and
Singapore).
The long-run average reputation score for a permanent bidder is determined from
his history of reputation scores, with the individual scores ranging between 0 and 10.
Sellers are divided into three groups: average score less than 9.7 (low score), average
score above 9.7 and below 9.9 (medium score), and average score above 9.9 (high
score). This definition allocates approximately 30%, 30%, and 40% across the three
seller groups.
The data is characterized by significant amount of international trade, with buy-
ers frequently procuring services from sellers residing outside their own geographic
locations. The welfare gains from trade accrued to U.S. buyers in this market have
previously been examined in Krasnokutskaya et al. (2014),18 finding relatively large
gains due to access to lower-cost providers, and smaller gains due to access to sellers
of different quality levels. However, these results do not directly translate into the
overall welfare gains in the international context. Not only do buyers from various
geographic regions differ in price sensitivity and the value of their outside option
but their access to sellers of different quality levels in their national markets varies
13Western Europe consists of: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
14Southern Europe consists of: France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
15Eastern Europe consists of: Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Ukraine.
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substantially.
We therefore take advantage of the market design and rich dataset to explain and
decompose clustering in international trading patterns by controlling for the country-
specific differences in the quality of sellers, as well as the country-specific differences
in buyers’ price sensitivity and their outside options. The dataset used in the analysis
includes 11,170 projects, for which 73,303 unique bids were submitted.
4.6 Descriptive Analysis
The following summary tables document the observed patterns in international
trade among buyers and sellers from different geographic regions and provide an initial
insight into the forces driving these patterns.
Tables 4.1 through 4.3 provide a summary overview of the bidding patterns across
buyer-seller country pairs. Table 4.1 considers the bidding patterns from the per-
spective of buyers, and shows the percentage of projects advertised by buyers from
a particular country that attract at least one bid from a particular seller country.
We observe a clear tendency for local trade, with a larger percentage of projects re-
ceiving bids from local bidders. For example, 33% of projects submitted by a North
American bidder receive at least one bid from a North American seller, while only
20% of projects initiated from South and East Asia do. Similar trend is observed
for Eastern European sellers, who participate in over 80% of projects advertised by
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Eastern European buyers, while only in 60% of projects from South and East Asia.
The tendency for localization is somewhat less prominent with Asian sellers, who
participate very frequently on all projects. However, South and East Asian projects
still receive their bids relatively most frequently.
This pattern is confirmed when looking at the relative contribution of seller coun-
tries to the total volume of bids across buyer countries, presented in Table 4.2. This
table emphasizes the prominence of Asian sellers in the market: 62% of all bids come
from Asian sellers, 31% from Eastern European sellers, with only the remaining less
than 7% coming from North American bidders.
Table 4.1: Percentage of Projects with Bids from a Seller Country
Conditional on Buyer’s Country
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 33.25 71.23 87.62
UK 32.37 74.31 87.97
Buyer Western Europe 28.18 75.03 85.91
Country Southern Europe 27.30 72.34 88.30
Eastern Europe 22.33 81.40 89.30
Oceania 27.84 74.86 90.57
South and East Asia 20.65 60.14 92.75
Note: Element (c1,c2) shows the percentage of projects submitted by a
buyer from country c1 that involve at least one seller from country c2
bidding for the project.
Table 4.3 offers the view of the market from the perspective of sellers, and shows
the percentage of projects by buyer country for which sellers submitted bids, relative
to the overall frequency of all projects by buyer country. Hence the table shows
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Table 4.2: Percentage of Bids Coming from a Particular Seller
Country, Conditional on Buyer Country
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 7.1 30.8 62.1
UK 6.5 31.6 61.9
Buyer Western Europe 6.0 32.7 61.3
Country Southern Europe 5.9 30.9 63.2
Eastern Europe 4.3 30.1 65.6
Oceania 5.0 31.0 64.0
South and East Asia 4.9 25.3 69.8
Overall 6.6 31.0 62.4
whether sellers participate more or less frequently on projects from a particular buyer
country than would be expected if they chose projects by chance. North American
sellers bid for North America and UK projects slightly more frequently but bid for
Eastern European and Asian projects much less frequently than would be expected
under random participation. Eastern European sellers participate relatively very often
on projects from their own region, and relatively less frequently on projects from South
and East Asia. Finally, the plentiful Asian sellers participate on projects without
much regard to the buyer’s country, with slightly increased relative participation on
projects by Asian buyers.
Since not every submitted bid is successful, it is informative to examine the pattern
of winning. The differences in the rates of winning and bidding can be driven either
by differences in sellers’ bidding behavior or their success rate. Table 4.4 shows the
percentage of winning bids out of all submitted bids for particular buyer-seller country
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Table 4.3: Relative Proportion of Projects by Buyer/Seller Coun-
try Pairs Conditional on Seller’s Country
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 1.05 0.99 1.00
UK 1.02 1.03 1.00
Buyer Western Europe 0.89 1.04 0.98
Country Southern Europe 0.86 1.00 1.00
Eastern Europe 0.71 1.13 1.02
Oceania 0.88 1.04 1.03
South and East Asia 0.65 0.83 1.05
Note: Element (c1,c2) shows the percentage of projects submitted by a
buyer from country c1 among all projects for which sellers from country
c2 submitted bids, relative to the overall probability of a project coming
from a buyer from country c1.
pairs. The rate of success varies considerably from the low of 21% for North American
sellers competing for projects from Eastern or Western Europe to the high of 71%
for Asian bidders competing for projects originating in Asia. The success rate also
varies across buyer countries with the same seller group. The general pattern follows
the tendency for localization observed from the bidding patterns, with bids resulting
in success more often on projects from a geographically nearby region.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 further examine the probability of winning from the perspective
of buyers and sellers, respectively. First, we present the percentage of projects from a
particular buyer awarded to sellers from different countries. Again, there is a distinct
localization pattern in which buyers choose to award their projects to sellers from the
same region. North American buyers choose North American sellers more frequently
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Table 4.4: Percentage of Winning Bids out of All Bids Submitted
by Buyer/Seller Country Pairs
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 33.09 47.64 61.99
UK 26.96 49.81 60.88
Buyer Western Europe 20.83 55.05 60.62
Country Southern Europe 25.97 52.94 61.04
Eastern Europe 20.83 52.57 57.81
Oceania 23.35 46.45 64.23
South and East Asia 24.56 46.39 71.48
Note: Element (c1,c2) shows the percentage of winning bids among the
bids submitted by sellers from country c2 for projects by a buyer from
country c1.
than any other buyer group. Similarly, Eastern European and Asian buyers choose
sellers from their own country more frequently than do buyers from other regions.
However, because of the prominence of Asian sellers in this market, they receive more
than 50% of projects regardless of the project’s country of origin.
Table 4.6 provides the proportions of projects awarded to a seller group by a
certain buyer relative to the overall percentage of projects awarded to the seller group
by any buyer. Again, the pattern confirms the geographic localization of projects,
and the buyer’s willingness to award projects to sellers located in a nearby region.
Finally, table 4.7 captures the differences in the size of the projects by consider-
ing the average winning bid (scaled by the project’s median bid) across buyer/seller
country pairs. Even though sellers from North America and Eastern Europe win less
frequently and fewer total projects than sellers from South and East Asia, their scaled
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Table 4.5: Percentage of Awarded Projects by Buyer/Seller Coun-
try Pairs Conditional on Buyer’s Country
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 11.01 33.94 54.31
UK 8.73 37.02 53.55
Buyer Western Europe 5.87 41.30 52.08
Country Southern Europe 7.09 38.30 53.90
Eastern Europe 4.65 42.79 51.63
Oceania 6.50 34.78 58.18
South and East Asia 5.07 27.90 66.30
Note: Element (c1,c2) shows the percentage of projects awarded to a
seller from country c2 among all projects submitted by buyers from coun-
try c1.
Table 4.6: Relative Proportion of Projects Won by Buyer/Seller
Country Pairs Conditional on Seller’s Country
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 1.14 0.96 0.99
UK 0.91 1.05 0.97
Buyer Western Europe 0.61 1.17 0.95
Country Southern Europe 0.74 1.08 0.98
Eastern Europe 0.48 1.21 0.94
Oceania 0.68 0.98 1.06
South and East Asia 0.53 0.79 1.21
Note: Element (c1,c2) shows the percentage of projects submitted by a
buyer from country c1 among all projects for which sellers from country
c2 submitted winning bids.
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average winning bids often exceed those for sellers from South and East Asia. Inter-
estingly, sellers from North America constitute the smallest part of this market but
their relative winning bids exceed those of other sellers in all cases except South and
East Asia, where their winning bid is actually the lowest. This could be explained by
sellers from North America being of higher quality than sellers from Eastern Europe,
who in turn are of higher quality than the sellers from South and East Asia. Alter-
nately, these differences could be explained by sellers from some regions bidding on
larger projects, or bidding on projects with fewer competitors.
Table 4.7: Average Winning Bid (Scaled by Median Bid) across
Buyer/Seller Country Pairs
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 0.99 0.94 0.91
UK 1.01 0.97 0.92
Buyer Western Europe 1.05 1.01 0.95
Country Southern Europe 1.10 0.91 0.95
Eastern Europe 1.13 0.87 0.95
Oceania 1.02 0.94 0.88
South and East Asia 0.84 0.91 0.89
Note: Element (c1,c2) shows the average of the winning bids across
projects that involve seller from country c2 winning a project submitted
by buyer from country c1.
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4.7 Estimation Results
In this section we present results of the structural analysis. We assume that buyer’s
value depends on seller’s group as defined by his observable characteristics (country
and long-run average score) and quality. Buyers may in turn differ in the weight
they put on quality as well as in the value of their outside option. The stochastic
components of buyers’ values (ε) as well as the stochastic part of outside option
are assumed to be distributed according the extreme value distribution. The weight
buyers put on quality is distributed according to the normal distribution.16 We use
the results of classification from Krasnokutskaya et al. (2014).18 They are obtained
on the basis of the projects auctioned by US buyers that are in $400-$700 range in
terms of the size and have a duration of 2-3 weeks. The details of the estimation
as well as the robustness check can be found in Krasnokutskaya et al. (2014).18 In
this paper we maintain the assumption that the classification of the quality groups is
uniform across buyer countries and rely on the classification recovered for US buyers.
Table 4.8 reports the estimation results for three specifications. The first speci-
fication assumes that the distribution of buyers’ weights for quality as well the dis-
tribution of their outside options is the same across all buyer countries. The second
specification allows the mean of the distribution of the outside option to vary across
buyer countries. The last specification additionally allows for the mean of the dis-
16To be absolutely correct this distribution should have a positive support. However, the mean and
the standard deviation of this distribution are sufficiently small so that the distributional assumption
does not cause problems.
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tribution of buyers’ weights for quality to differ across buyer countries. We would
expect the fit to improve as we go from Specification 1 to Specification 3 since if buy-
ers’ choices differ across buyer countries in a systematic way then controlling for this
observable buyer characteristic should help to rationalize larger fraction of choices.
Notice, however, that all three specification assume unilateral tastes, i.e. buyers from
a specific country may be willing to pay more or less for quality but not for a specific
country of a bidder.
Results of the estimation are broadly consistent across specifications. The esti-
mated variances of unobservables are of reasonable magnitude whereas the estimated
mean of the outside option is below the expected value from most of “inside” options.
This is not surprising since buyers rarely prefer outside option to the “inside” ones.
The specifications that allow for observed heterogeneity in buyers’ weights and out-
side options indicate that non-trivial differences exist across buyer countries. Thus
buyers from South Europe, Eastern Europe and South and East Asia appear to be
more price sensitive than buyers from other countries. The difference appears to be
substantial (recall that the expected price sensitivity for US buyers is fixed at one).
The estimated quality levels, while monotone within country-score group, appear to
be higher in richer specifications.
Next, we investigate the fit of these specifications to the data. In particular, for
every buyer country we compute the share of projects that are allocated to sellers
from North America, Eastern Europe, South and East Asia or to the outside option,
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Table 4.8: Buyers’ Tastes and Quality Levels
Specification (1) (2) (3)
log (σε) fixed=0 −0.069 −0.223
µv0 −2.521 −2.098 −9.667
log (σv0) log (σε) log (σε) log (σε)
µα 1.142 fixed=1 fixed=1







South and East Asia 0.98
Buyer-country fixed effects
North America 1.415 −0.678
UK −0.68 −10.274
Western Europe −0.37 0.274
Southern Europe −0.825 −3.823
Eastern Europe 0.834 8.132
Oceania −0.34 20.439
South and East Asia −1.262 −0.142
Quality levels
North America low score Q=1 0.426 −0.077 0.511
North America low score Q=2 1.04 0.604 0.977
North America medium score Q=1 0.698 0.37 0.666
North America medium score Q=2 1.974 1.502 1.732
North America high score Q=1 1.284 0.819 1.204
North America high score Q=2 1.423 0.739 1.123
Eastern Europe low score Q=1 −0.138 −0.039 0.408
Eastern Europe low score Q=2 1.027 0.668 1.053
Eastern Europe medium score Q=1 0.595 0.306 0.712
Eastern Europe medium score Q=2 1.909 1.448 1.723
Eastern Europe medium score Q=3 1.919 1.421 1.747
Eastern Europe high score Q=1 −0.274 −0.369 −0.217
Eastern Europe high score Q=2 1.522 1.057 1.37
Eastern Europe high score Q=3 1.888 1.34 1.707
South and East Asia low score Q=1 fixed=0 fixed=0 fixed=0
South and East Asia low score Q=2 0.864 0.432 0.823
South and East Asia low score Q=3 1.835 1.303 1.647
South and East Asia medium score Q=1 −0.697 −0.798 −0.203
South and East Asia medium score Q=2 0.65 0.267 0.943
South and East Asia medium score Q=3 1.572 1.022 1.417
South and East Asia high score Q=1 1.244 −0.1 1.218
South and East Asia high score Q=2 2.366 1.896 1.827
Note: The results are based on the dataset consisting of 11,170 projects. The quality level for South and
East Asia, low score, Q=1, is normalized to be equal to zero.113
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respectively. The results for each specification are reported in Tables 4.9 through 4.11,
respectively, which are analogous to Table 4.5 which is based on the observed data.
As expected, the fit improves from Specification 1 to Specification 3. Interestingly,
Specifications 1 and 2 tend to underpredict the allocation towards sellers from South
and East Asia in favor of the outside option. Specification 3 does quite well with the
exception of the cell corresponding to UK buyer’s choices. It somewhat underpredicts
allocation of projects towards Eastern European or South and East Asian sellers in
favor of the outside option. However, overall the fit appears to be quite good: an
average discrepancy per cell is one percentage point.
Table 4.9: Probability of Winning (Participation Effects Included)
Based on Specification 1
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 10.61 34.47 52.82
UK 9.43 35.42 52.95
Buyer Western Europe 8.13 38.36 51.27
Country Southern Europe 8.15 37.24 52.59
Eastern Europe 6.54 38.98 52.98
Oceania 7.74 35.20 55.17
South and East Asia 6.67 27.00 63.88
The subsequent analysis relies on re-solving the model under a variety of circum-
stances. For this, we need to recover the distribution of sellers’ private project costs
as well as the entry costs. Our methodology for performing this step is explained in
the following section.
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Table 4.10: Probability of Winning (Participation Effects In-
cluded) Based on Specification 2
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 10.84 37.85 50.94
UK 8.90 36.67 45.96
Buyer Western Europe 7.95 39.95 46.28
Country Southern Europe 7.66 37.56 45.05
Eastern Europe 6.85 42.71 49.79
Oceania 7.63 37.74 49.62
South and East Asia 5.71 25.00 50.74
Table 4.11: Probability of Winning (Participation Effects In-
cluded) Based on Specification 3
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 10.26 34.55 55.19
UK 6.70 27.23 39.03
Buyer Western Europe 8.23 39.36 52.41
Country Southern Europe 7.62 37.50 54.88
Eastern Europe 6.44 39.20 54.36
Oceania 7.39 34.74 57.87
South and East Asia 6.26 25.22 68.52
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4.8 Recovering the Distributions of
Sellers’ Private Costs
We recover the distributions of the sellers’ costs conditional on sellers’ attributes
by combining the bid distributions of permanent sellers with the corresponding inverse
bid functions:
FC(c|(q, x)) = FB(ξ−1(c|(q, x))|(q, x)).
Here the inverse bid function, ξ(b|(q, x)), is derived from the first order condition of
the corresponding permanent seller’s optimization problem:
ξ(bi|(q, x)i) = bi −
P (iwins | bi;σE−i, σB−i)
∂
∂b
P (iwins | b;σE−i, σB−i)|b=bi
.
Next, we assess the magnitude of the cost of entering the auction using the model
of strategic participation. Under this model, the observed probability of participation
satisfies the following equation
FE(E[π
p(x, k)]) = Pr(i ∈ Ap,(x,k)),
where FE(.) is the distribution of the entry costs and π(x, k) is the ex-ante expected
profit. We estimate the mean and standard deviation of the entry costs distribution
by fitting truncated normal distribution (truncated at 0) to the set of points implied
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by the ex-ante expected profit and the probability of participation values for various
covariate cells and quality groups.
The recovered inverse bid functions and the distributions of sellers’ private costs
are depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
The estimates indicate substantial heterogeneity in sellers’ costs across countries.
The estimated project cost distributions are typically “increasing” in sellers’ quality.
More specifically, the cost distribution of the high-quality group is always shifted
to the right relative to the distribution of the medium-quality group. However, the
low-quality group often has costs that are comparable to the costs of the high-quality
group. This indicates substantial cost heterogeneity unrelated to the quality that
characterizes the participants in this market.
The estimated value for the mean and standard deviation of the entry costs are
0.082 and 0.077, respectively. That is, entry costs roughly correspond to 7% of the
project cost on average. This number is slightly higher than that documented in other
markets.17 The relatively large entry costs estimated in this market may reflect the
fact that active bidding for a project involves substantial interaction with the buyer
and possibly the preparation of supplementary materials.
Last, we would like to comment on the limitations of the analysis presented in
this section. In this analysis, we take seller’s reputation score as given and ignore the
possible dynamic considerations associated with reputation building. To mitigate this
17Studies of the US highway procurement market have estimated entry costs to be around 2− 5%
of the engineer’s estimate.
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Figure 4.1: Estimated Bid Functions
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Eastern Europe
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Figure 4.2: Estimated Density of Seller’s Cost Distributions
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North America High score
Eastern Europe
South and East Asia
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concern, we base our estimation of the distribution of sellers’ costs on the optimization
problem of a permanent seller. While permanent sellers may still take reputation-
related concerns into account, the incentives associated with these concerns are likely
to be quite weak. A single score does not make a large impact on average reputation
score once a seller has completed ten or more projects. Indeed, in the data a bad
score does not make a statistically significant impact on the probability of winning
or on the bid of an established seller.
4.9 Analysis of Clustering Decomposition
Next, we investigate the buyer-seller country pair trading patterns. We base this
analysis on Specification 3 from Table 4.8.
Clustering in the Data
First, we document clustering in the data by computing the average deviation
of the shares of projects allocated to different seller countries from the average allo-
cation across buyer countries. This computation is reported in the first column of
Table 4.15. We find that the largest deviations correspond to Western European,
Eastern European, and South and East Asian buyers, and somewhat less pronounced
for the North American buyers. As Table 4.13 demonstrates, North American buyers
show slight preference for North American sellers away from Eastern European or
South East Asian sellers, Western European buyers show preference toward Eastern
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European sellers away from South East Asian sellers, Eastern European buyers to-
wards Eastern European sellers away from South and East Asian sellers, and buyers
from South and East Asia for South and East Asian sellers away from East Euro-
pean sellers. Overall, the bias appears to be regional with the exception of UK and
Southern Europe which do not exhibit the regional bias.
Clustering generated by the model
We perform similar calculations using the fit table for Specification 3, with the
results presented in Table 4.14. We find that Specification 3 is capable of generating
75% of the distortion away from the average pattern for all country groups except for
UK and Eastern Europe. In the case of UK the model predicts excessive allocation
towards the outside option at the expense of Eastern European and South East Asian
sellers; whereas in the case of Eastern European buyers the model cannot generate
sufficient bias towards Eastern European sellers. Interestingly, the model overpredicts
the bias in the case of South and East Asian buyers – it indicates that according to
their tastes they should be even more biased than they actually are. It is worth
emphasizing that the model does a good job reproducing more than 75% of the
clustering pattern without relying on bilateral buyers’ preferences or country-pair-
specific sellers’ costs.
Removing participation effects
Our next step is to separate clustering associated with sellers’ self-selection into
participation from the clustering driven by the differences in buyers’ preferences for
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seller’s attributes as well as sellers’ heterogeneity in those attributes. We achieve this
through the following exercise: We generate a new set of participants for every auction
by randomly reallocating sellers who have submitted bids in any given week to other
projects auctioned off in this week; we then recompute bids that sellers reallocated
to a different project would have submitted in the “new” auctions, and determine
the winner under this new set of participants. The aggregated winning patterns
under random participation are presented in Table 4.12, which is again analogous to
Table 4.5 but purging the participation effects. To simulate the “new” bids we extend
the numerical algorithm proposed in Marshall et al. (1994)36 to our setting.
Table 4.12: Probability of Winning (After Removing Participation
Effects) Based on Specification 3
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 7.72 33.16 59.12
UK 4.14 15.75 26.72
Buyer Western Europe 7.65 33.97 58.38
Country Southern Europe 6.81 34.17 58.77
Eastern Europe 6.16 34.21 59.63
Oceania 6.16 30.10 63.74
South and East Asia 6.11 25.83 67.02
We repeat the analysis of clustering decomposition for the case when clustering
is defined relative to the shares of sellers’ countries with respect to the number of all
bids submitted, regardless of whether they are successful or not. The corresponding
results are presented in Tables 4.16 through 4.18, starting with clustering in the data,
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Table 4.13: Clustering Bias Relative to the Average Shares of
Awarded Projects (Based on Data)
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 0.040 -0.026 -0.014
UK 0.017 0.004 -0.022
Buyer Western Europe -0.011 0.047 -0.036
Country Southern Europe 0.001 0.017 -0.018
Eastern Europe -0.023 0.062 -0.041
Oceania -0.005 -0.018 0.025
South and East Asia -0.019 -0.087 0.106
Note: Clustering bias is computed relative to the average market share of
awarded projects by seller’s country, with the averages computed across buyer
countries.
Table 4.14: Clustering Bias Relative to the Average Shares of
Awarded Projects (Based on Specification 3)
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 0.033 -0.020 -0.005
UK -0.003 -0.093 -0.167
Buyer Western Europe 0.012 0.028 -0.033
Country Southern Europe 0.006 0.009 -0.008
Eastern Europe -0.006 0.026 -0.013
Oceania 0.004 -0.018 0.022
South and East Asia -0.007 -0.114 0.128
Note: Clustering bias is computed relative to the average market share of
awarded projects by seller’s country, with the averages computed across buyer
countries.
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Table 4.15: Average Deviation of the Shares of Allocated
Projects
Data Model Diff (%)
North America 0.050 0.039 0.225
UK 0.028 0.191 -5.809
Buyer Western Europe 0.061 0.045 0.259
Country Southern Europe 0.025 0.014 0.445
Eastern Europe 0.078 0.030 0.615
Oceania 0.031 0.029 0.073
South and East Asia 0.138 0.171 -0.240
Note: Presented are the average deviations of the shares of projects
allocated to different seller countries from the average allocation across
buyer countries. Results are based on specification 3.
followed by clustering generated by the model with and without participation effects.
For the clustering in the data, we find that Eastern European sellers tend to win
more frequently while South and East Asian sellers win less frequently than their
respective shares would suggest; this pattern is consistent across all buyer countries
with the exception of the South and East Asian buyers, in which case the pattern is
reversed, with South and East Asian buyers winning disproportionably more often,
while Easter European seller winning relatively less often.
As before, we find that the model explains more than 90% of the clustering bias
for most countries with the exception of UK and Eastern Europe. In the case of
UK buyers, the model underpredicts clustering across all buyer countries, while for
Eastern European buyers, frequency of winning is underpredicted for Eastern Euro-
pean sellers and overpredicted for the other sellers. The model reproduces the overall
patterns of clustering for the Eastern European and South and East Asian sellers,
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with the former winning relatively more frequently than predicted by their share of
bids, while the latter are winning less frequently; the model also captures the reversal
of this pattern when the buyer originates from South and East Asia.
Finally, accounting for the selection into participation and removing the participa-
tion effect by reallocating bidders into auctions randomly within the same week gen-
erates approximately half of the bias, with the exception of UK, where the clustering
bias is underpredicted even further. Thus it appears that selection into participation
contributes significantly to generation of clustering pattern.
Table 4.16: Clustering Bias Relative to the Shares of Submitted
Bids (Based on Data)
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 0.044 0.029 -0.081
UK 0.021 0.060 -0.089
Buyer Western Europe -0.007 0.103 -0.103
Country Southern Europe 0.005 0.073 -0.085
Eastern Europe -0.020 0.118 -0.108
Oceania -0.001 0.038 -0.042
South and East Asia -0.015 -0.031 0.039
Note: Clustering bias is computed relative to the overall market share of sub-
mitted bids by seller’s country.
Decomposing Buyer’s Choice
In this section we decompose buyers’ choices to identify the mechanism that drives
clustering in the model. Specifically, we homogenize sellers from different countries
with respect to the importance of their average reputation scores, their quality levels,
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Table 4.17: Clustering Bias Relative to the Shares of Submitted
Bids (Based on Specification 3)
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 0.037 0.036 -0.072
UK 0.001 -0.038 -0.234
Buyer Western Europe 0.016 0.084 -0.100
Country Southern Europe 0.010 0.065 -0.075
Eastern Europe -0.002 0.082 -0.080
Oceania 0.008 0.037 -0.045
South and East Asia -0.003 -0.058 0.061
Note: Clustering bias is computed relative to the overall market share of sub-
mitted bids by seller’s country.
Table 4.18: Clustering Bias Relative to the Shares of Submitted
Bids after Removing the Participation Effect (Based on Specifica-
tion 3)
Seller Country
North Eastern South and
America Europe East Asia
North America 0.011 0.022 -0.033
UK -0.025 -0.152 -0.357
Buyer Western Europe 0.011 0.030 -0.040
Country Southern Europe 0.002 0.032 -0.036
Eastern Europe -0.004 0.032 -0.028
Oceania -0.004 -0.009 0.013
South and East Asia -0.005 -0.052 0.046
Note: Clustering bias is computed relative to the overall market share of sub-
mitted bids by seller’s country.
126
CHAPTER 4. TRADING ACROSS BORDERS IN ONLINE AUCTIONS
Table 4.19: Average Deviation of the Shares of Submitted
Bids
Data Model Diff (%)
North America 0.097 0.088 0.086
UK 0.109 0.237 -1.169
Buyer Western Europe 0.146 0.131 0.101
Country Southern Europe 0.112 0.100 0.110
Eastern Europe 0.161 0.115 0.286
Oceania 0.057 0.059 -0.046
South and East Asia 0.052 0.084 -0.617
Note: Presented are the average deviations of the shares of submitted
bids by different seller countries from the average allocation across buyer
countries. Results are based on specification 3.
and their cost distributions. At each step, we first re-solve the bidding functions under
the new set of primitives and then recompute the market shares of sellers’ countries
for each buyer country. In this exercise we maintain participation patterns in terms
of the probability of a seller from country c1 submitting a bid to an auction held by
a buyer from country c2, as well as the probability of a seller from quality group q1
competing against a seller from quality group q2 as they are observed in the data.
Results of this analysis are reported in Tables 4.20 through 4.23.
Note that these simulation results differ from the model fit tables presented above,
as they are based on a smaller number of bidders per auction. Due to computational
constraints, we are not resolving the equilibria for all possible configurations of bid-
ders.
Taking the distribution of average scores, quality levels and costs as they are recov-
ered from the data, we simulate the market shares of sellers from different countries
127
CHAPTER 4. TRADING ACROSS BORDERS IN ONLINE AUCTIONS
for each particular buyer, as shown in Table 4.20. Similar to its empirical counter-
part, Table 4.5, these results point to a distinct clustering pattern. More importantly,
the findings from the simulations are consistent with the analysis of the patterns of
clustering bias discussed above, where Eastern European sellers won more frequently
than the relative share of their bids (or awarded projects) on auctions allocated by
buyers from every country except South and East Asia, while South and East Asian
sellers experience the opposite effect.
The deviation from the average market shares (where the average is taken over
buyers’ countries) is strongest for South and East Asian buyers, as well as Eastern
European, Western European and buyers from the UK. Notice that the magnitudes
are not exactly the same, as the participation pattern is somewhat different from
the data. The deviation from the average shares mostly occurs due to the difference
in allocation between Eastern European and South and East Asian sellers across
buyer countries. In particular, UK and Western Europe tend to allocate to Eastern
European sellers more frequently than their average market shares would suggest
at the expense of Asian sellers; whereas Asian buyers allocate more frequently to
Asian sellers and outside option at the expense of Eastern European sellers. This is
consistent with the reversal of the clustering pattern for the case of Asian buyers that
we have observed in our earlier analysis of the model predictions.
In the first step presented in Table 4.21 we homogenize the contribution of the
average reputation score to seller’s quality across countries. Homogenization of repu-
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tation scores actually strengthens the clustering pattern for the Eastern European and
Asian buyers while leaving deviation from average shares for other buyer countries
unaffected. The main pattern reflects reallocation of some projects away from Asian
and towards Eastern European sellers with the exception of Eastern European buy-
ers, who reallocate projects towards North American sellers and away from Eastern
European sellers; and Asian buyers who reallocate projects from Eastern European
sellers and outside option towards Asian sellers.
Next, in addition to the average score we also homogenize quality levels across
seller countries. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4.22. The changes
in allocations are small and mostly due to the movement from the outside option
to North American or Eastern European sellers (as in UK and Western Europe);
from Eastern European towards Asian sellers (for South and Eastern Europe); or
from Asian sellers towards North American or Eastern European sellers. Thus ho-
mogenization of qualities works to reduce clustering for Eastern European and Asian
buyers but the effects are rather small.
Finally, in the last step we homogenize the distributions of costs conditional on
quality and average score across sellers countries. This induces large reallocation
of projects away from the clustering pattern. Thus, it appears that clustering is
primarily generated by the differences in costs which translate into differences in
prices. Heterogeneity of sellers’ cost combined with buyer heterogeneity in price
sensitivity is the driver generating the clustering pattern.
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Table 4.20: Percentage of Projects Awarded to Seller from a Given
Country Conditional on Buyer’s Country (Based on Simulation)
Seller Country
North Eastern South and Outside
America Europe East Asia Option
North America 11.68 44.48 39.64 4.19
UK 11.75 44.63 39.27 4.35
Buyer Western Europe 11.50 45.02 39.11 4.37
Country Southern Europe 12.24 42.53 41.41 3.82
Eastern Europe 9.63 43.02 42.82 4.54
Oceania 11.66 43.89 40.44 4.00
South and East Asia 10.19 39.81 43.16 6.84
Note: Element (c1,c2) shows the percentage of projects awarded to a
seller from country c2 among all projects submitted by buyers from coun-
try c1. Results are based on simulation.
Table 4.21: Percentage of Projects Awarded to Seller from a Given
Country Conditional on Buyer’s Country (Based on Simulation after
Removing the Effect of the Average Score)
Seller Country
North Eastern South and Outside
America Europe East Asia Option
North America 10.64 45.00 40.50 3.86
UK 10.68 45.09 40.29 3.94
Buyer Western Europe 10.44 45.38 40.21 3.97
Country Southern Europe 11.32 42.83 42.20 3.65
Eastern Europe 8.83 42.95 44.09 4.13
Oceania 10.73 44.32 41.13 3.82
South and East Asia 9.30 38.86 45.94 5.89
Note: Element (c1,c2) shows the percentage of projects awarded to a
seller from country c2 among all projects submitted by buyers from coun-
try c1. Results are based on simulation after purging differences in the
distribution of average scores.
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Table 4.22: Percentage of Projects Awarded to Seller from a Given
Country Conditional on Buyer’s Country (Based on Simulation, after
Removing the Effect of Differences in the Average Score and Quality)
Seller Country
North Eastern South and Outside
America Europe East Asia Option
North America 10.72 46.10 39.34 3.84
UK 10.75 46.21 39.15 3.89
Buyer Western Europe 10.50 46.45 39.15 3.90
Country Southern Europe 11.37 43.64 41.32 3.67
Eastern Europe 8.93 43.82 43.13 4.11
Oceania 10.83 45.30 40.06 3.81
South and East Asia 9.47 39.99 44.70 5.84
Note: Element (c1,c2) shows the percentage of projects awarded to a
seller from country c2 among all projects submitted by buyers from coun-
try c1. Results are based on simulation after purging differences in both
the distributions of average scores and quality levels.
Table 4.23: Percentage of Projects Awarded to Seller from a Given
Country Conditional on Buyer’s Country (Based on Simulation, after
Removing the Effects of Differences in the Average Score, Quality,
and Cost)
Seller Country
North Eastern South and Outside
America Europe East Asia Option
North America 10.71 45.10 40.57 3.65
UK 10.78 45.41 40.19 3.65
Buyer Western Europe 10.62 45.60 40.14 3.66
Country Southern Europe 10.97 41.27 44.29 3.47
Eastern Europe 9.00 43.04 44.11 3.87
Oceania 10.78 43.74 41.92 3.58
South and East Asia 9.63 39.79 45.31 5.27
Note: Element (c1,c2) shows the percentage of projects awarded to a
seller from country c2 among all projects submitted by buyers from coun-
try c1. Results are based on simulation after purging differences in the
distributions of average scores, quality levels, as well as the distribution
of costs.
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4.10 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on international trade by investigating bi-
lateral patterns of trade in the online market for programming services. Geographic
clustering of trade appears to persist in this online market despite seemingly low
transaction costs that should not in theory depend on geographical proximity. We
construct a model that rationalizes buyers’ allocative decisions in this market through
the country-based heterogeneity in buyers’ preferences and sellers’ attributes. The
primitives of the model are recovered by applying novel methodology developed in
Krasnokutskaya at al. (2014)18 that accommodates the features of the data struc-
tures typically observed in online markets. We find that the model works well in
reproducing clustering patterns observed in the data despite the lack of buyer-seller
country pair preference component or buyer-seller country pair specific costs. In par-
ticular, we find that clustering is driven primarily by the difference in costs (and thus
prices) of sellers and the differences in buyers’ price sensitivities. Additionally, we
show that clustering induced by the difference in these primitives is further amplified
by strategic participation on the part of the sellers.
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